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Abstract 
The timing of post-conflict elections is a critical element that requires careful 
consideration to minimize the risk of producing adverse results. Through examining 
the literature and studying Liberia's 1997 and 2005 elections, this work seeks to 
identify the best timing practices for post-contlict elections. The theoretical basis, 
which is inspired by the works of Roland Paris and Terrence Lyons, is that if the 
circumstances are to permit the long-term goal of democratization, then post-conflict 
elections should follow a protracted transition period prior to holding the election. 
The transition period is utilized to develop favorable conditions for long -term 
stability, such as operational state institutions, adequate security, and a liberal political 
climate. Holding elections under such conditions may increase the likelihood for 
sustainable oeace bv not onlv ending the war. but also advancinl! democratization. 
However, when a long transition period is not possible, then elections can serve the 
limited goal of war termination. Elections which achieve the limited goal of war 
termination but fail to deliver a fully democratic regime may increase the risk of 
future civil conflict but can still be considered a partial success. 
Word Count: 21 ,000 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Civil wars are increasingly settled through negotiations and peace agreements. 
A central component of almost all post-civil war peace agreements drafted after the 
conclusion of the Cold War is the promotion of democracy through holding post-
conflict elections. Democratization has become an integral part of the road to peace. 
It is widely believed that liberal democracies are more stable, provide greater liberty 
and quality of life, and are less prone to internal violent conflict than non-democratic 
states. This work does not question the merits of democracy, but explores the 
challenges of post-conflict elections, which are the cornerstones of post-conflict 
democratization efforts. However, the post-conflict environment is generally not 
conducive to elections. Roy Licklider (2008:316) bluntly posed the following 
question: "How do groups of people who have been killing each other with 
considerable enthusiasm and success come together to form a common government?" 
While the orosoect of democracv is desirable. the oro motion of elections in 
fragile, war-tom states has unwelcome side effects which have the potential to 
jeopardize peace agreements and reignite violent conflict. Herein lies a dilemma, as 
stated best by Roland Paris (2001 :774): "The dilemma is to figure out how to set war-
shattered states on the path toward liberal democracy in the long term, while avoiding 
the destabilizing effects of political liberalization in the short run." 
This work examines the significance of timing of post-civil war elections and 
questions whether rapid democratization with arbitrary election dates, that are not 
based on conditions on the ground, are prudent, or whether certain conditions should 
be present before election dates are set. This work's theoretical basis holds that if the 
circumstances are to permit the long-term goal of democratization, then post-conflict 
elections should follow a protracted transition period prior to holding the election. 
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The transition period is utilized to develop favorable conditions for long-term 
stability, such as adequate security, operational state institutions, and a liberal political 
climate. Holding elections under such conditions may increase the likelihood for 
sustainable peace by not only ending the war but also advancing democratization. 
However, when a long transition period is not possible, elections can serve the limited 
goal of war termination. 
Foreign actors involved in post-conflict recovery often advocate the holding of 
early elections for three main reasons. First, elections establish legitimate leaders to 
whom power will be quickly transferred. Through the transfer of power, the influence 
of international actors is less likely to be perceived as a foreign invasion or 
occupation. Secondly, international actors can more easily justify their actions by 
supporting an elected regime than a non-democratic government. Lastly, early 
elections lift some ofthe post-conflict recovery burden from foreign actors by sharing 
responsibility with the newly elected government. For these and other reasons, there 
has been a push for rapid democratization through holding early elections. 
In opposition to this paradigm is a growing amount of criticism, mostly in 
academia, of promoting early post-conflict elections. The basis for this argument is 
that elections have adverse effects on recovery if the conditions are not suitable. 
Relevant conditions include security, polarization of society, development of political 
parties, and stability of state institutions. Utilizing the experiences of Liberia, this 
work adds to the ongoing debate on democracy promotion and the timing of elections 
in civil war-tom states. 
The work provides a theoretical framework and relevant background on the 
Issue of timing of post-conflict elections and subsequently examines two West 
African cases. The two central arguments of this paper are: (I) conditions 
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surrounding and preceding the elections affect the success of the election and (2) 
timing of post-conflict elections is best when it is contingent upon conditions under 
which the elections are to be held. 
1.1 Overview of Paper 
The paper contains three sections and five chapters. The first section covers 
theoretical background on post-conflict elections and democracy promotion. The 
second section is comprised of two case studies: the 1997 and 2005 elections in 
Liberia. The final section summarizes the findings of the case studies. 
Chapter I introduces the topic and gives an overview of the paper. This 
chapter lays out the key objectives and gives a brief review of relevant literature. 
The paper exposes the dichotomy regarding timing of post-conflict elections between 
recommendations in contemporary academic literature and common practice in 
international peace operations. 
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework for the paper, which is derived 
from academic literature. This chapter provides the background and emergence of 
democracy promotion in peace operations. The multiple, and often conflicting, goals 
of post-conflict elections are examined. Then, the chapter covers the negative side 
effects of post-conflict elections and the relevance of conditions to prevent or manage 
the side effects. Finally, chapter two summarizes the risks and tradeoffs of promoting 
elections too soon after the oeace al!:reement. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine Liberia's 1997 and 2005 elections. Putting the 
elections in context, each chapter provides a brief review of the respective preceding 
civil war. In detail, the chapters examine timing of the elections and conditions 
relating to Liberia's security, institutional strength, and political parties prior to 
elections. The analyses examine the intended goal of each election, whether the 
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conditions surrounding the elections were suitable to meet the goals, and whether the 
timing was appropriate and effective. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the finding of the case studies and draws conclusions 
from those findings to determine the best timing for post-conflict elections. The paper 
acknowledges that the best available option is not necessarily the ideal option and 
therefore the best timing often differs from the ideal timing. 
1.2 Methodology 
This work utilizes a combination of a theorY-based. aualitative literature studv 
and empirical support through a comparative study of the 1997 and 2005 post-conflict 
election in Liberia. The qualitative literature study provides a deeper understanding 
of the issue and lays the foundation on which to analyze the case studies. 
Because there are too few relevant cases for quantitative statistical analysis of 
how timing and conditions prior to post-conflict elections determine success and 
outcome, an in-depth study of two cases is conducted. The phenomenon being 
studied is complex and requires detailed examination of each individual case. This 
study examines causal relations more thoroughly, and therefore is more meaningful, 
than purely statistical analysis. By focusing on conflict cases that are similar in many 
regards, but differ in processes, the study aims to find reasons for each outcome. 
To eliminate non-relevant factors that could influence the outcome of the 
study, two cases were chosen that lent themselves well for comparison. The elections 
following the First Liberian Civil War and the Second Liberian Civil war are 
examples of post-war elections following similarly protracted intrastate conflict with 
varied approaches to the timing of elections which resulted in varied outcomes. 
Following the First Liberian Civil War (1989 to 1996), the international 
community promoted rushed presidential and national assembly elections in 1997, 
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less than one year after heavy fighting ended. Charles Taylor won a landslide victory 
on the hopes that violence would end, but violent conflict continued to flare up 
regularly and the county returned to civil war after only two years of relative peace. 
The Second Liberian Civil War began in 1999 and officially ended in 2003 
after President Taylor resigned and fled into exile. Following the peace agreement, 
the international community supportcd a two-year period of transitional government 
rule and significant rebuilding efforts, before holding elections in late 2005. 
The main objectives of the case studies are to: (I) explore the processes and 
contributing factors that led to the timing of elections in the chosen cases; (2) analyze 
the conditions preceding the elections; (3) and examine the impact of conditions and 
timing on the success of said elections. 
In order to remain focused and consistent in both cases, a standard set of 
questions is addressed in the analysis of each case. The central research question is 
whether Dost-conflict elections should be held earlv or should be delaved until the 
country is in a better position to manage the impacts of the elections. Here we can 
differentiate between two distinct categories: the first category is where post-conflict 
elections were successful, the second is where the elections were not successful. The 
reason for making this distinction is simple. If elections did not achieve the desired 
outcome, then the following questions must be addressed: What role did the timing of 
elections play in the failure of the elections? (i.e. Was the security situation 
inadequate for holding elections? Were the institutions capable of dealing with the 
added challenges brought out by the campaigns and elections? Was there sufficient 
time for the development of political parties?) If elections achieved the desired 
outcome, then the following questions must be addressed: Did the timing of the 
5 
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elections playa role in the success of the elections? Did the timing of the elections 
allow for favorable conditions surroundinl! the elections? 
This work does not address issues of sequencing of elections. There is a long-
running debate among election experts on whether presidential, parliamentary, and 
local elections following armed conflict should be held simultaneously, or whether 
they should be sequenced. While this important issue is closely related to the issues 
that are addressed by this work, the issue of sequencing falls outside of the scope of 
this study. 
1.3 Literature Survey 
Since the 1990s there has been a growing body of research and literature on 
post-civil conflict recovery and on post-conflict elections. Democratic elections now 
play an integral role in peacebuilding and recovery. The international community 
heavily influences the holding and promotion of post-conflict elections, as foreign 
actors provide much of the resources and experience required to hold elections. 
While the importance of holding post-conflict elections is established, the 
issue of timing has not been settled. There are two dominant schools of thought. The 
first is that elections should be held early so that the war-tom country can begin 
rebuilding under legitimate leadership. Promoting early elections has been the 
preferred practice for international actors and has several benefits. As noted above, 
early elections expedite the establishment of legitimate leadership and enable the 
transfer of power. Also, early elections expedite the sharing of recovery burden and 
allow international actors to bel!in removinl! themselves from the effort. This view is 
underpinned by a prominent 2005 USAID commissioned review of 14 post-conflict 
elections. The review found that early post-conflict elections had moderately positive 
impacts on reconciliation and state building through increases in international 
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assistance and thus reported favorably on the promotion of early elections (USAID 
2005). 
Furthermore, post-conflict elections serve multiple purposes. Terrence Lyons 
(2002) states that rushed post-conflict elections may be preferred if the prime intended 
purpose is war termination. Lyons explains that war termination may necessitate 
rapid planning and holding of elections in order to gain consent from belligerents and 
to keep momentum following a cease-fire. Delays in these processes can jeopardize 
the peace process and result in a return to war. Lyons concludes that post-conflict 
elections may need to be rushed to promote the limited but essential goal of war 
termination. because war termination is a orereauisite for democratization and other 
long-term goals. Therefore, according to Lyons, in certain cases promoting rushed 
and tenably flawed elections may be more beneficial than delaying until the 
conditions are suitable to conduct "free and fair" elections. 
The second school of thought is critical of unconditional timing and holds that 
premature post-conflict elections can destabilize the host country and be 
counterproductive. Several notable scholars including Roland Paris, Benjamin Reilly, 
and Edward Newman support this view. A common criticism of rushed elections is 
that they primarily serve foreign actors and are not in the best interest of war-torn 
states (Reilly, 2004). Elections naturally polarize societies and add tension to already 
fragile situations (Newman & Rich, 2004). Therefore, the holding of elections in 
insecure environments and without the necessary capability to mange the added 
challenges brought on by elections poses dangers to security and stability (Reilly, 
2002). According to Chester Crocker (200 I :9), "if societies do not meet the 
predetermined criteria for democratization, then elections should be deferred during 
the peacebuilding phase to minimize the risks of polarizing and weakening societies." 
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Commonly identified conditions are a stable security environment, adequate state 
institutions, and development of appropriate political parties. 
Yet, other scholars argue that democratization is a lengthy process and the 
international community must commit the necessary resources to allow enough time 
for transformation to take place (Cook & Call, 2003). This may mean deferring 
elections until the conditions are appropriate. The standard time to schedule elections 
is two years after the signing of the peace agreement. Cook and Call suggest that, 
deoendinl! on the circumstances. a lonl!er oeriod of five or six vears mav be 
necessary. However, increasing the length of the operation increases the costs and 
necessary commitment from the international community. 
As shown through this admittedly brief survey of relevant literature, there are 
differences in opinions and ongoing dialogue about the issue of post-conflict election 
timing. While no single approach is applicable to all cases, the vast majority of the 
academic literature expresses a dissenting opinion on the current practice to promote 
elections soon after the signing of a peace agreement. 
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Chapter Two: Background and Theory 
2.1 The Road to Democracy Promotion 
The push by international actors for rushed elections following peace 
agreements is a relatively new phenomenon, which is best understood in it's historical 
context. The political liberalization of post-conflict states is now an integral part of 
international peacebuilding efforts. Peacebuilding, which has become a catchword in 
the lexicon of peace studies, only emerged after the end of the Cold War. While in 
recent decades other international organizations have become active in peacekeeping 
(i.e. ECOWAS, AU, SADC, etc.), the United Nations remains the most significant 
non-governmental actor today, and monopolized the field during the Cold War. 
Therefore, the expansion of involvement from peacekeeping to multidimensional 
peace operations, including peacebuilding and democracy promotion, is best viewed 
by examining the evolution of UN peace missions. 
Prior to the I 990s, the UN's principal peace miSSIOns were limited to 
peacekeeping, which generally consisted of observing ceasefires and controlling 
neutral territories. which served to seoarate warrinll: oarties (Paris. 2004: 14), UN 
peace operations began with the United Nations Emergency Force's (UNEF) 
engagement in Egypt in 1956 after the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and 
Israel. Having secured consent from all warring parties, UNEF monitored the 
withdrawal of invading troops and secured the Egypt-Israeli border. UNEF was 
mandated to only use force in self-defense and abstained from meddling in political 
issues (Paris, 2004:15). UNEF's authorization outlined that the operation was not to 
interfere with domestic political issues and not affect the political situation (UN 
1956). It was considered vital to peacekeeping operations that peacekeepers not 
interfere with or become involved in domestic and local political issues of the 
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operation's host nation. The rules that determined the UN's involvement in Egypt set 
the precedent for international peacekeeping missions carried out by the UN until the 
end of the Cold War (Paris,2004: 15). 
Roland Paris lavs out four orimarv reasons whv oeacekeeoers did not meddle 
in domestic politics during the Cold War. 
\. Legally, UN involvement was limited by specific restrictions and terms. 
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter denied the right of the organization to 
intervene in domestic issues falling under local jurisdiction. 
2. Warring parties that allowed UN peacekeeping tolerated only limited roles, 
mostly the monitoring of cease-fires and enforcement of neutral areas. Increasing the 
role of international organizations would require deeper involvement of foreign actors 
and was generally not tolerated by the warring parties. 
3. The two competing superpowers prevented outside involvement in the 
domestic affairs of their allies and strategic interests. In order to preserve their 
respective statuses and control over allies, neither the Soviet Union nor the US wanted 
interference from international organizations. As permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, the superpowers held veto power and could block any substantive 
Council resolution, irrespective of the resolution's level of support in the Council. 
Therefore, UN Security Council resolutions that mandated the new peace operations 
were likely to pass only if US and Soviet interests were not affected. The US and 
Soviets generally directly handled operations that could affect strategic interests. 
4. Because of fundamental disputes between the US and Soviets, the UN 
could not promote any specific type of government during its peace operations. 
Therefore. interference in local oolitics of a host state was not oossible. even if that 
state was not directly of strategic value to the superpowers. As a result, international 
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peacekeeping operations refrained from involvement in controversial ideological, 
governance, and political issues. 
The end of the Cold War resulted in significant modifications of the restricting 
circumstances which had limited conflict, and post -conflict, UN security operations. 
Both the Soviet Union and the US decreased financial support and military 
involvement in places that no longer held strategic significance. This shift of support 
in the international system led to the conclusion of several ongoing conflicts while 
also destabilizing other regimes and leading to the outbreak of several new conflicts. 
Many conflicts that were prolonged through the involvement of the US and the Soviet 
Union and served as proxy battlegrounds came to an end, as the warring parties no 
longer received the financial and military support necessary to carry on fighting. 
Because the US and Soviets soul!ht to decrease their foreil!n involvement. soace 
opened up for involvement of international organizations (Paris 2004: 16). 
New conflicts, primarily civil, intrastate conflicts, erupted as foreign aid 
diminished and left state regimes weakened and vulnerable to rebel uprising. Many 
regimes, especially in the developing world, were plagued with corruption and 
achieved loyalty among supporters through neopatrimonialism. These corrupt 
s'jstems 01 \o'jalt'j te\'j ot\ \)ub\i.c teW\llces, oftet\ lieti.'1eli \\\rOU'b\\ 10tei.'bt\ ai.li, \\\a\ aIe 
distributed as rewards for regime support. Without the influx of foreign support, 
many of the corrupt and inefficient regimes formerly propped up by Soviet or 
American aid became unstable and thus vulnerable to rebel uprising (Snyder, 
2000:225). This increase in civil conflicts created additional needs for assistance 
from the UN and other lOs (Paris, 2004: 17). 
The conclusion of old conflicts, emergence of new conflicts, and change in 
circumstances previously limiting UN involvement, created additional opportunities 
11 
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and need for outside intervention. According to a calculation by Roland Paris 
(2004:17) the decade following the Cold War (1989 to 1999) saw the deployment of 
33 new UN peace operations. Throughout the four decades of the Cold War, the UN 
only deployed 15 peace operations in total. While the number of operations 
increased, so did the scope of operations. Post-Cold War operations often included 
disarmament of former fighters, monitoring of police conduct, preparations for 
democratic elections, and assistance in drafting of new constitutions. 
Peacekeeping became only one aspect under the umbrella of peace operations 
conducted by the UN. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali introduced the term 
"peacebuilding" in 1992 and made the distinction between peace, enforcement, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. His definition of peacebuilding included disarming 
former fighters, repatriating and resettling refugees, protecting human rights, 
strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting and monitoring democratic 
elections (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11-12). 
While Cold War peacekeeping efforts were almost entirely carried out by the 
UN, peacebuilding was not governed by any central authority efforts and involved a 
plethora of lOs, national development agencies, and NGOs. Even though 
peacebuilding missions were individually managed and not required to follow any 
specific formula, they all promoted democratization and popular elections to enable 
sustainable oeace in oost-conflict states (Paris. 2004: 19). Another sil!nificant 
commonality of peacebuilding missions is the encouragement of immediate 
democratization, where election dates are set with little regard to conditions on the 
ground and are only significantly postponed under extremely unfavorable conditions. 
Since the end of the Cold War, almost all post-civil war peace agreements have 
included a plan for elections. Roland Paris (2004: 19) notes that all peacebuilding 
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operations resulted in elections being held within three years of the start of each 
respective mission, except in rare instances where continued conflict forced 
postponement or cancellation. 
2.2 What Constitutes a Successful Election? 
Terrence Lyons (2002) asserts that post-conflict elections serve multiple 
purposes, which can sometimes be contradictory and therefore may require 
prioritization. To determine the best timing for post-conflict elections, it must first be 
established what the intended outcome of a oost-conflict election is and what 
achievements are sought through the promotion of an election. Only in consideration 
of the intended outcome can success or failure of an election be determined. 
The foremost purpose of holding elections is to legitimately determine 
leadership of a state's government. Democratic elections are widely regarded as the 
only legitimate way of establishing leadership. If the primary goal of a post-conflict 
election is to establish leadership that is democratically chosen by the people, then of 
most importance is that the elections are deemed free and fair and that the outcome 
reflects the will of the people. If free and fair elections are the primary goal, then 
elections can be held as soon as the conditions allow free and fair elections. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that holding elections early is favorable, as it 
expedites the establishment of legitimate, indigenous and democratically elected 
leaders. 
However, the international community promotes post-conflict elections as part 
of the peacebuilding process. Therefore, the results of elections must be considered in 
the greater context of peacebuilding. As part of peacebuilding, the desired 
accomplishments of elections must be expanded beyond merely the ability to produce 
legitimate leadership. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992: ~ 21) explained in An 
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Agenda for Peace that peacebuilding efforts intend to "support structures that will 
tend to strengthen and support peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." Holding 
elections plays a significant role in creating those conditions. Viewed in the context 
of peacebuilding, elections continue to seek the creation of legitimate and indigenous 
leadership, but the overarching goal shifts to creating conditions for sustainable peace. 
Even elections that are deemed free and fair polarize the people and have the potential 
to encourage hateful speech during campaign season, encourage violence, increase 
tension, encourage formation of allegiances based on wartime loyalties, etc. Thus, 
even if international assistance provides the resources to manage free and fair post-
conflict elections, proper institutions and mechanisms must also be in place to prevent 
campaigning and elections from being counterproductive to the peacebuilding effort. 
Therefore, while rushed elections held in unfavorable conditions, which are often 
facilitated with assistance of the international community, may produce legitimate 
leadership, such elections have the potential to adversely affect domestic peace. In 
light of this, Roland Paris (2004: 155) questions whether "internationally sponsored 
democratization efforts rhave 1 heloed to create the conditions for stable and lastin!.! 
peace, which is the stated goal of peacebuilding." 
Under the banner of peacebuilding, post-conflict elections are intended to 
advance potentially conflicting objectives regarding war termination and 
democratization (Lyons, 2002:216; Shaw, 2006:26). Because the objectives favor 
different timing and different circumstances, strategies can clash and may require 
prioritization of objectives (Lyons, 2002). 
The success of a post-conflict election in regard to war termination depends on 
its effect on ending violent conflict and sustaining peace (Lyons, 2002). Elections 
have a mixed record in this regard. Elections in Mozambique, Namibia and 
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Zimbabwe helped end war. Elections in Liberia may have helped immediate war 
termination, but failed to sustain peace. The 1992 elections in Angola directly 
contributed to the country's relapse into a state of violent conflict. 
Judl.!inlz the success of a oost-conflict election in rel.!ard to democratization is 
more complex. Multiple cycles of elections are required to definitively determine the 
effectiveness of the democratization efforts (Lyons, 2002:217). Post-conflict 
elections only signify the onset of potential democratic governance. The holding of 
elections only marks the beginning of an often protracted and difficult course of 
democratic consolidation. Furthermore, holding elections can legitimize autocratic 
leaders who rule and cling to power through intimidation and compulsion, often to the 
detriment of the constituents (Lyons, 2002:217). 
In conclusion, due to the multiple goals of post-conflict elections, 
accomplishments must be judged on multiple levels. The international community 
promotes elections as part of the peacebuilding process; therefore, the broader impact 
of elections with regard to their effect on creating conditions for stable and lasting 
peace must be taken into consideration. Not only must the success of post-conflict 
elections be judged on whether the elections were free and fair and produced 
legitimate leadership, but the elections must also be judged on whether they 
contributed to ending conflict and whether they advanced democratization. 
2.3 Post-Conflict Elections: Enabling Peace while Encouraging Conflict 
Through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
western liberal democracy with popular elections and civil/political rights emerged as 
the best available form of government. The perceived triumph of western liberal 
democracv influenced the desil.!n of oeacebuildinl.! ooerations and led to the 
promotion of popular elections following civil war. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
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Francis Fukuyama (1989:4) famously declared "the universalization of western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government." 
An underlying theory for the promotion of post-conflict elections is the 
democratic peace theory, which holds that democracies rarely go to war with each 
other. The issues of democratic peace have been among the most widely studied and 
debated issues in political science over the last 20 years. Furthermore, offshoots of 
the theory expand beyond the limits of interstate wars. While the majority of work is 
based on interstate conflict, various studies on intrastate conflict have found that 
democratic states are less prone to civil conflict than non-democratic states (Paris, 
2004:42). Democratization and the promotion of post-conflict elections have 
emerged as preferred methods for creating conditions for sustainable peace and 
stability in civil war-tom states. 
UN Secretaries General Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Anan, as well as several US 
Presidents have spoken in support of democratization as a means of enabling peace. 
Although only formally institutionalized by President George W. Bush, democracy 
promotion as a means to encourage peace dates back to the First World War. 
President Woodrow Wilson believed that, because democratic governments are based 
on consent of the governed, force and coercion served only as a last resort (Paris, 
2004:40). President Wilson held that world peace, interstate and intrastate, could only 
be possible though political liberty and required democratic governance as its 
foundation (Paris, 2004:41). More recently, President Clinton's agenda included 
"democratic enlargement" which sought to globally promote market democracies and 
to "counter the aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to 
democracy" (Brinkley, 1997:116). Promoting democracy was a central foreign policy 
issue for President George W. Bush. President Bush promoted what became known 
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as the "freedom agenda" which focused on imposing western style democracy abroad 
to combat perceived threats, most notably terrorist organizations in the Middle East 
(Carothers, 2006). 
The acknowledgement among leaders that democratic states are less likely to 
fight each other, and less likely to experience civil war, has led to the promotion of 
democracy and popular elections. However, transitions to democracy, and in 
particular elections, inherently create competition and tension that can further polarize 
the population and lead to conflict (Paris, 2004: 156). In fact, political tension and 
mild conflict is normal in democracies. It is a sign of a functioning system (Dahl, 
1986: 14). Tension and conflict enable leaders with contending points of view to find 
practicable solutions by means of nonviolent negotiation and mutual concession. By 
channeling the political differences through a system of dialogue and compromise, 
differences that could otherwise lead to violent conflict are settled through 
negotiation. Thus, democratization and elections increase tension and conflict in 
order to prevent future conflict, often under already volatile circumstances with 
fragile peace. Because democracy depends on contention to confine the severity of 
the conflict, Roland Paris (2004: 157) refers to this issue as the "fundamental paradox 
with the workings of democracv." 
Popular elections are the cornerstone of democracy, but elections are also the 
prime cause of increased tension and polarization during the democracy promotion 
process. Popular elections rely on competition, contestation, and effective use of 
tension and conflict. Even though the promotion of elections aims to provide a 
nonviolent alternative to manage political and ideological differences, popular 
elections require active contestation and contention between politicians and their 
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respective political parties (Paris, 158). Therefore, post-conflict elections playa 
contradictory role on the road to peace. 
Post-conflict states are especially vulnerable to the negative effects associated 
with democratic elections. Not only do post-conflict states suffer from unstable 
security situations, but they also typically lack functioning government institutions 
and suffer from deep societal cleavages with severe polarization (Paris. 2004). 
Elections are by definition polarizing and can further divide societies already torn 
apart by violent civil conflict. Chester Crocker (2001) asserts that post-conflict states 
not ready to hold elections become increasingly fragile by the polarizing of society. 
Therefore, Crocker (2001) advocates deferring post-conflict elections until societies 
have stabilized. 
Strongly polarized states tend to be less suited to manage the increased tension 
and polarization linked with elections. In severely polarized societies, adversaries 
may be so devoted to their cause that they prefer to harm, or eliminate, their 
opposition than seek peaceful resolution to overcome their differences; therefore, 
internal fighting and forceful clashes are more likely to erupt in severely polarized 
states than in other states (Paris, 2004:168). Generally, states that have recently 
emerged from civil war continue to have acute societal polarization and severe tension 
among the citizenry. Consequently, such states are especially vulnerable to 
recidivism of violent civil conflict (Paris, 2004: 168). Encouraging further 
polarization and tension can have severe repercussions, especially when campaigning 
skews negative and exploits social cleavages. 
Violent conflict invariably strengthens social identities and polarizes societies 
(Kaufmann, 1996; Paris, 2004). At the outbreak of intrastate conflicts, people who 
identify with several groups are often forced bv social pressures or blatant force to 
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pledge their allegiance to only one group. Social divisions usually form around 
religion, ethnicity, or geographical lines (Reilly, 2008). In the aftermath of civil war, 
public support for political parties generally falls along societal divisions formed 
through the onset of war and therefore strengthens these structures (Reilly, 2008). 
Naturally, states that do not suffer from severe societal polarization are in a better 
position to absorb the added tension brought on by elections (Paris, 2004). 
Post-conflict societies generally do not have a culture of peaceful dispute 
resolution (Paris, 2004: 169). Societies with mechanisms for peaceful dispute 
resolutions are accustomed to seeking out these mechanisms to prevent differences of 
opinion from evolving into violent conflict. However, post-conflict states are 
generally not well equipped to manage the turbulent effects of post -conflict elections 
until they have developed methods of peaceful dispute resolutions. 
Considering the vulnerable condition of post-conflict states, the promotion of 
elections can result in a recurrence of violence and end un doing more harm than good 
(Paris, 2004: 175). In order to prevent the inherent added conflict associated with 
elections to escalate into acts of violence and threaten peace, the timing of elections 
and conditions under which campaigning and elections are conducted is significant. 
Scholars and practitioners commonly identify issues including security, strength of 
state institutions, and development of political parties as relevant to the feasibility of 
post-conflict elections. 
Security: A stable security environment is the foundation on which any 
democratization effort is built. If the security challenges of ending civil war and the 
threats of parties dissatisfied with the peace agreement are not dealt with, 
democratization efforts and elections will have little chance of success (Stedman & 
Rothchild, 2002). Any peace agreement must foremost end violent conflict and 
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enable security, thus allowing for the "preconditions for democratization" (Lyons, 
2002:226), If the intense security challenges and threats bv groups opposing the peace 
agreement cannot be managed after civil war, then efforts to implement the agreement 
and hold elections will likely be futile (Lyons, 2002). Scholars and practitioners 
generally agree that in order to maintain a secure environment, warring parties must 
be disarmed. Stedman and Rothchild (2002:226) assert that demobilizing and 
disarming warring parties "can both contribute to reducing the threat of insecurity and 
increase the prospect for democratization." The United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (2000:16) states that "in the short term, the failure to disarm 
and demobilize former combatants effectively may contribute to an immediate relapse 
into war." 
Furthermore, how security operations are managed can have significant 
impacts on the probability of peaceful elections (Stedman & Rothchild, 2002; Lyons, 
2002). The practices and procedures carried out to enforce security conditions 
following a peace agreement can affect how the government will operate and how 
authority will be exercised after the elections stipulated in the peace agreement 
(Lyons, 2002). If the restructuring of armed forces creates systems and procedures 
which aid democratic governance after the elections, then that process may increase 
security and further the possibility for democratization (Lyons, 2002). Disarming and 
demobilizing fighters decreases the ability to pursue civil war and thus decreases the 
likelihood that the war will renew (Lyons, 2002:227). In addition, demobilization and 
disarmament of fighters orovides the perceptions of securitv and lavs the foundation 
to develop peaceful political systems and procedures. (Lyons, 2002). 
State Institutions: Strong state institutions (i.e. constitution, law enforcement, 
judiciary, executive bureaucracy, etc.) are necessary to manage the challenges that 
20 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
come with elections and provide a secure environment. Institutional stability is 
fundamental to the sustainability of the state and its ability to manage conflict. 
Roland Paris (2001; 2004) challenges the assumption that rushed elections and rapid 
political liberalization in states that are suffering, or have suffered, from civil violence 
will promote domestic peace. Because democratization can exacerbate societal 
conflicts, Paris (2001:767) argues that "peace builders should delay liberalization 
until they have constructed political [ ... J institutions that are capable of managing the 
societal tensions that naturally arise from the process of democratization." 
Democratic governance relies on a system of institutions to settle disagreements and 
imoose rules and regulations to orderlv and oeacefullv manage comoetition (Paris. 
2004: 159). Adding contention through promoting elections before the necessary 
institutional framework is in place can lead to violent conflict if contention exceeds 
the capabilities of state institutions to peacefully manage political conflict (Paris, 
2004: 159). 
The strength of institutions is reflected on the likelihood of successful post-
civil war elections and democratization (Barnes, 2001). Institutions must be strong 
enough to resist becoming corrupt and being used as institutional tools of political 
leaders, as is a frequent occurrence in young governments (Bames, 200 I). Jack 
Snyder (2007:7), also in favor of strengthening state institutions before holding 
national elections, states that "democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks 
bloodshed in the short term, but also the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with 
the capacity to block democratic consolidation over the long term." 
States that lack institutional strength and stability tend to be unable to 
efficiently enforce state policies and govern effectively. Weak states may fail to 
protect some societal groups, therefore leaving them to fend for themselves and 
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consequently take up anns in self-defense (Paris, 2004: 173). This can lead 
adversarial groups to also take up arms and can eventually trigger fighting. 
In addition to protecting its citizens from threat, state institutions must also 
function to resolve contending societal disputes (Paris, 2004). In cases where state 
institutions are unable to resolve societal disputes peacefully, the involved parties may 
try to advance their cause by circumventing state institutions and may resort to acts of 
violence (Paris 2004). The state's ability to manage contending demands is of 
particular importance during tumultuous times, such as around election time. In 
support of this position, research by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) has found 
that emerging democracies are less likely to remain democratic if the new regime 
lacks functioning state institutions, as are required to regulate the state, collect taxes, 
and legally settle disputed. 
Post-conflict states generally come out of conflict with ineffective 
governmental institutions or entirely without operational governmental institutions 
(Paris, 2004). Generally, government institutions are either rendered nonfunctioning 
through war, or serve a limited function and are used as a political tool of a belligerent 
party. Lacking functional governmental institutions, post-conflict states must endure 
the negative side-effects that accompanv elections without having built the necessarY 
strength to control the added tension and conflict brought on by elections (Paris, 
2004). Therefore, the need for strong institutions is sometimes greater than the need 
for democratic governance, as capable institutions are a necessity for successful 
democratization (Paris, 2004). 
Political Party Development: In order for election to be meaningful, voters 
must have sufficient choices between political parties and candidates. Typically, the 
early political leaders who emerge after a peace agreement are the current, or former, 
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generals and militia leaders. Just because militia leaders now present themselves as 
politicians does not make them statesmen. Militia leaders often do not represent the 
will of the people and, given legitimate competition, might not garner the voters' 
support. Longer periods between the peace agreement and election allow for the 
development of new political parties and the emergence of new candidates, who do 
not benefit from war-time power networks. Such local leaders, often emerging from 
civil society, tend to be more familiar with the communities' needs, and thus may 
better represent the will of the people. Leaders who emerge from civil society also 
benefit from a history of peaceful dispute resolution and are thus less prone to resolve 
issues through the use of force. While it is unreasonable to definitively state that civil 
leaders make better political candidates than do militia leaders, it is clear that the 
emergence of civil leaders gives voters more choices on election day. 
In sum, while democratization of post-conflict states is intended to enable long 
term peace and stability, rapid post-conflict elections have destabilizing effects and 
may even trigger outbreaks of violence. Therefore, the timing of elections is 
significant as the conditions surrounding the elections can have serious implications 
on the short- and long-term success of the elections. Several contributing factors 
make holding elections soon after reaching a civil war peace agreement particularly 
troublesome. First, the security situation in war shattered states tends to be fragile, as 
animosity is often rampant and fighters are not yet disarmed or demobilized. Second, 
post-conflict states generally come out of conflict with ineffective governmental 
institutions or entirely without operational institutions, which would otherwise serve 
to peacefully resolve the added tension and conflict brought on through elections 
(Paris. 2004: 168), Third. it takes time for civil leaders to mobilize their political 
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organizations and become viable candidates, as is necessary to give voters sufficient 
choices on election day. 
While expectations of post-civil war elections are usually high, the conditions 
are often unfavorable (Reilly, 2004:114). Post-war states often lack the desired level 
of security, institutional strength, political climate, and societal cohesion needed to 
hold elections that can end the war, further democratization, and enable sustainable 
peace. While post-conflict elections are powerful tools for peace building and 
democratization, poorly timed and hastily implemented elections can produce the 
opposite outcome (Reilly, 2004: 115). 
2.4 The Dangers of Poorly Timed Elections 
As addressed in previous sections of this paper, the conditions on the ground 
surrounding elections are significant to the success of the elections and therefore the 
timing of post-conflict elections is significant. Post-civil war elections that are held 
too early can increase the risks of a return to violence and recidivism of war, enable 
"power grabbing" by local elites, evoke extreme reactions from citizens, and hinder 
the development of political parties and civil society. 
Adequate security to control violence and prevent recidivism to war is an 
absolute necessity before the start of campaigning and elections. In addition to 
security, elections require functioning state institutions capable to allow free and fair 
voting to take place. If the sufficient level of security and institutions capable of the 
task are not present, then no effective democratization process can take place 
(Neuman & Rich, 2004). Promoting early elections that will likely destabilize peace 
is reckless and counterproductive as outbreaks of violence hinder progress on war 
termination and democratization (Lyons, 2002:219). A longer period of transition 
may be necessary to create a sufficient level of security and functioning state 
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institutions and allow for the development of political and civil structures prior to 
voting (Kumar, 1998; Lyons, 2002). 
Post-conflict elections that are scheduled too early and are held with weak 
political institutions and insufficient guidance and oversight can counteract the long-
term objective of creating a sustainable democracy (Reilly, 2002:121). Elections held 
under such conditions tend to bring about political candidates that are primarily 
seeking to gain power for their own benefit, which is generally not in the interest of 
the population as a whole (Reilly, 2002). Post-conflict elections often legitimize 
leaders who are partially responsible for the outbreak of war in the first place and 
remain committed to exclusionary visions for the state (Reilly, 2002). In other words, 
post-conflict political parties are sometimes only political manifestations of the 
warring parties that were involved in the original conflict. 
Also, if elections are held early and little time has passed since the cessation of 
violence, the state may remain deeply polarized while mental and physical scars 
remain fresh. Without allowing time for forgiveness and reconciliation, rushed 
elections generally evoke more extreme reactions from citizens than elections 
scheduled following rebuilding and reconciliation efforts (Reilly, 2002). 
Furthermore, post-conflict elections that are held too early can hinder the 
development of inclusive, moderate political parties and consequently subvert the 
emerging democratic order. Several scholars (Reillv. 2002: Paris. 2004: Snvder & 
Mansfield, 2007, et al.) agree that this issue has been a central problem related to 
timing of UN-managed elections. The political parties that emerge immediately after 
civil war are often based on exclusionary and narrowly focused visions of a hyped 
leader, and therefore often do not offer moderate policies, inclusive campaigning and 
widely acceptable ideological platforms. Lyons (2002:217) cautions that "the 
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international community should not cynically accept meaningless 'demonstration 
elections' that legitimize authoritarian regimes and provide little scope for voter 
choice." 
The arguments listed above would suggest that it is universally beneficial to 
postpone elections until the conditions are most favorable. However, delaying until 
conditions are favorable may require excessive international resources and 
commitment, may hinder the development of local political capabilities, and may not 
be suitable if the primary goal is war termination. 
While a prolonged transitional period may be beneficial to the host state, 
international donors generally are only willing to provide limited aid to such missions 
(Lyons, 2002:216). Furthermore, election timetables that are dependent on suitability 
and aptness can result in seemingly open-ended missions; increases in goals, 
standards, and complexity of the mission increase the chance of severely prolonging 
the mission (Paris, 2004:208). The international community's unwillingness to 
sponsor open-ended commitments often prevents the use of conditional timing aimed 
at achieving favorable circumstances prior to elections (Paris, 2004:210). 
Additionally, a prolonged internationally monitored transitional period can 
hinder the development of the host state's political capabilities (Chandler, 2006; Paris, 
2004). Long transitional periods limit indigenous involvement in governance and 
decision-making and consequently limit the roles and development of indigenous 
political capabilities. Extended international monopolization of governance can 
inhibit the ability of the state to govern itself after power is restored to local leaders 
(Chandler, 2006). 
Finally, prolonged transitional, or rebuilding, periods prior to elections are not 
always suitable to the desired outcome of the post-conflict elections. If the primary 
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goal of the elections is to achieve war termination, then delaying elections until 
conditions are favorable for long-term democratization may put the peace agreement 
at risk and result in a return to fighting (Lyons, 2002). To satisfy the warring parties 
and to hold momentum after the cease-fire, war termination may necessitate rapid 
planning and holding of elections. Therefore, if an election is primarily intended to 
achieve the short-term goal of war termination, rather than the longer road of 
democratization, then expedited timing may be necessary, even if it results in a flawed 
election. 
The timing of post-conflict elections is a critical element that requires careful 
consideration to minimize the risk of producing adverse results. As stated, preferred 
timing depends on the utility and desired outcome of the elections. For example, the 
goals related to democratization require a longer transition time where elections 
should follow a period of institution building, security provision, political 
development. etc. If the elections can be delaved to allow sufficient time and securitv 
for the transformation of civil society and other groups into political parties, then 
more inclusive parities that a e representative of the people's needs may emerge 
(Lyons, 2002:216). Such political parties are widely acknowledged to be helpful 
ingredients for peaceful elections and progress toward democratization. On the other 
hand, the limited goal of war termination may require rushed elections to maintain 
consent from belligerents and keep the momentum following the peace agreement 
(Lyons, 2002:231). In addition, despite the fact that rushed elections pose serious 
risks in fragile post-conflict environments, limited resources may necessitate shorter 
time frames. 
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Chapter Three: Liberia's 1997 Election 
1.1 Historical Context 
Liberia is a small West African country on the Atlantic coast with nearly 3.5 
million citizens (LISGIS, 2009). With US support, freed American slaves founded 
Liberia in 1847 on land purchased by the American Colonization Society (Adebajo, 
2002:45). The freed slaves and their descendents, known as Americo-Liberians, 
comprised only five percent of the total population, but ruled Liberia for 133 years 
(Adebajo, 2002:45). The Americo-Liberian leadership created an oligarchy that 
systematically excluded and oppressed the local population (Adebajo, 2002). The 
repressive Americo-Liberian government created deep divisions within Liberian 
society (Adebajo, 2002). 
On April 12, 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe and his supporters staged a 
coup d'etat to depose sitting President Tolbert and Liberia's ruling Whig Party (Lyons, 
1998). The overwhelming celebration and support among indigenous people for the 
regime change that toppled the Americo-Liberian rule illustrated the hatred that had 
been building toward the repressive Americo-Liberian regime (Adebajo, 2002:45). 
Doe's regime came to power by using force and proved its viciousness within 
days through the assassinations of former President Tolbert and thirteen of his senior 
advisors and cabinet members (Adebajo, 2002). Similar to the Americo-Liberian 
regime, Doe ruled by force and awarded positions of high rank and trust mostly to 
members of his ethnic background (Lyons, 1998). Doe did not open political space 
and even resorted to execution and forced exile to remove potential political rivals or 
perceived threats to his regime (Adebajo, 2002:45). While Doe proclaimed 
democracy and held elections in 1985, the elections were undoubtedly manipulated 
and far from democratic. Doe's autocratic rule did not allow for nonviolent dissent 
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and led to multiple unsuccessful military-led uprisings against Doe's regime, until 
Charles Taylor launched his offensive in 1989 (Adebajo, 2002). 
3.2 The First Liberian Civil War 
As a reaction to Doe's progressively despotic rule, Charles Taylor formed an 
opposition movement, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), with which he 
led the Christmas Eve invasion in 1989 (Lyons, 1998). Taylor, who formerly served 
as an official in Doe's regime, was limited by a closed political system and thus could 
not openly seek peaceful change of leadership. With Taylor's leadership, the NPFL 
successfully advanced from northern Liberia and wrestled control of towns and 
villages from the central government. To combat the NPFL' s orogress. the Liberian 
military forces under Doe's command carried out scorched earth tactics, razing entire 
villages and causing great civilian casualties in northern Liberia. Doe's brutal and 
unwarranted reaction to the NPFL invasion further alienated much of the Liberian 
population, especially already oppressed ethnic groups such as the Gio and Mano, 
driving them to support the NPFL insurgency (Lyons, 1998). Taylor's NPFL troops 
advanced through the hinterlands and reached outlying areas of Liberia's capital, 
Monrovia, in July 1990. Doe was loosing control of Liberia. Taylor controlled much 
of the hinterlands and Monrovia was falling into a lawless chaos, plagued by ethnic 
killings and looting (Lyons, 1998). In August 1990, the sub-regional group Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized the Nigerian-led 
ECOW AS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to interfere and restore peace in 
Liberia (Lyons, 1998). 
Taylor viewed ECOMOG's interference as a threat to his operation and 
believed that ECOMOG would prop up Doe's failing government (Alao, 1998). 
Without external intervention and given the NPFL's momentum, Taylor believed he 
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was on the brink of overthrowing Doe's government, thus asserting his rightful place 
as Liberia's leader (Alao, 1998; Lyons, 1998). Rejecting the foreign peace operation, 
Taylor ordered attacks on the ECOMOG soldiers and personnel as they entered the 
capital city, thus requiring ECOMOG to engage in fighting and alter their operation 
goal to that of to peace enforcement (Alao, 1998; Lyons, 1998). 
ECOMOG's Nigerian-led military forces managed to push the NPFL out of 
the greater Monrovia area within weeks of the start of the operation. By November 
1990, ECOMOG managed to negotiate a cease-fire. The cease-fire stipulated that the 
capital city and its outskirts would be guarded by ECOMOG forces and ruled by an 
interim administration. Furthermore, the remainder of Liberia, which the government 
had lost control over, would be governed by the NPFL from their de-facto capital in 
the northern Liberian city of Gbarnga, approximately 160km inland of Monrovia 
(Lyons, 1998). 
The civil war became more widespread and intensified over the following 
years (Lyons, 1998). At least twelve individual peace agreements were successfully 
negotiated, but implementation continued to fail and each agreement consequently 
collapsed (Paris, 2004). The war became more widespread as new armed factions and 
warrint! parties emert!ed. These new militias partook in the ont!oing and chronic 
looting and sought to secure leverage during negotiations, and power in the 
forthcoming government, at the conclusion of war (Lyons, 1998). Major players 
among the new militias included Sierra Leone-backed United Liberation Movement 
of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and the Liberia Peace Council (LPC). The NPFL 
as well as ULIMO later separated into several factions each fighting autonomously 
and with little central guidance. The multitude of militias and their conflicting 
allegiances often motivated by leaders' personal rivalries or greed added to the 
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challenges of negotiating peace agreements (Lyons, 1998). Furthermore, it was often 
not in the best interest of the militia leaders to end conflict, as militias and their 
leaders gained power, status, resources and wealth from the ongoing conflict (Lyons, 
1998). 
Taylor was determined to gain rule of Liberia by defeating and overthrowing 
Doe's regime without entering into anv negotiated compromise. ECOMOG therefore 
deemed Taylor to be the prime obstruction to any peace settlement. As Taylor and the 
NPFL quickly became the main target, ECOMOG forces allied with the Liberian 
military forces and rebel militias in order to more effectively fight the increasingly 
powerful NPFL and Taylor (Lyons, 1998). In early 1990, Doe's forces only 
controlled the immediate areas around Monrovia, while aylor's NPFL controlled 
over 90 percent of the country and operated a functional banking system in addition to 
trading commodities such as diamonds, gold, rubber, and timber with international 
trading partners (Lyons, 1998). In September 1990, Doe was captured and killed by 
rebel militia and an internationally supported interim governrnent took control of 
Monrovia and its immediate surroundings. 
3.3 Attempts at Peace 
All attempts to form a unified government and end the conflict were futile 
until June 1995, when Taylor agreed to meet with ECOWAS leaders to work out a 
strategy to end the ongoing war that had become a stalemate (Lyons, 1998). In 
September 1995, heads of major militias met in Abuja, Nigeria for another round of 
talks. The Abuja Accord resulted in a Council of State made up of militia leaders, a 
civil society leader, a traditional leader and a professor (Lyons, 1998). The agreement 
gave five months for militias to disarm and scheduled national elections in August 
1996. less than one vear from the signing of the accord (L vons. 1998). 
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While the Abuja Accord was hailed as a successful negotiation and significant 
progress, implementation of the accord was not carried out. Despite the agreement, 
militias were hesitant to give up their weapons and the disarmament process was soon 
after derailed. It became increasingly apparent that the short timetables were 
unrealistic and hope for success and national elections was lost when militia factions 
abandoned the peace efforts and attacked ECOMOG personnel in December 1995, 
only three months after signing the Abuja Accords (Lyons, 1998). The breakdown of 
peace led to further rounds of fighting with increasing viciousness. The most 
destructive fighting occurred in April 1996 in Liberia's capital city, Monrovia. 
During that period of the conflict, almost all aid, UN, governrnent and business 
offices were looted and most foreign aid workers fled the country (Lyons, 1998). 
The failure of the state, and the violent lawlessness that it had become. drove 
West African neighbors to renew efforts to end the Liberian Civil War (Lyons, 1998). 
Another round of negotiations in Abuia in August 1996 brought a new accord. Abuia 
II built on the original Abuja agreements from the 1995, but increased time for 
disarmament and demobilization and added deterrents against violations of the 
accord. Deterrents included war crimes tribunals and a ban from participation in 
future governments (Lyons, 1998). The second Abuja agreement called for 
disarmament to start in November 1996 and specified elections to take place in May 
1997 (Lyons, 1998). Abuja II finally led to national elections in Liberia and returned 
the state to constitutional rule under elected leadership. 
3.4 Conditions Prior to elections 
3.4.1 Security 
Several violent attacks and incidents of fighting were reported, primarily in the 
months immediately following the peace agreement (UNSC, 1997b). While 
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ECOWAS had the power to sanction or otherwise punish factions according to the 
Abuja agreement, no action was taken against factions for violations. Investigations 
proved difficult and holding groups accountable for cease-fire violations through 
sanctions or withdrawal of the participation in the upcoming government risked 
compromising the fragile peace (Lyons, 1998). However, despite isolated incidents, 
the UN Security Council (1997:4) stated one month prior to elections that "relative 
peace and stability have continued to prevail throughout Liberia and the country is 
now considered secure enough for elections to take place nationwide." 
The disarmament period lasted from November 1996 until February 1997. In 
total, more than 10,000 weapons and over 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were 
collected (UNSC, 1997:5). As fighters were wary of the new peace agreement and 
thus hesitant to hand over their weapons, disarmament started slowly but increased 
throughout the allotted period (Lyons, 1998). The disarmament process was 
considered satisfactory and the number of illegal weapons was significantly reduced. 
However, the demobilization of fighters and systematic dismantling of militia factions 
received less attention and militia networks largely remained intact (Lyons, 1998). 
Due to the lack of time, organization, and resources, demobilization was rushed and 
only required fighters to submit any amount of weaponry and add their information to 
the registry (Lyons, 1998). Critics argue that many hardened fighters, wary of the 
uncertain peace and future of the country. forwent the demobilization process. 
In preparation for the elections, ECOMOG deployed approximately 11,000 
troops in 48 locations to enable a peaceful campaign environment and provide 
security for the elections (UNSC, 2004:5). 
3.4.2 Institutional Strength 
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Liberia was not capable of managing elections or maintaining order in the 
state without foreign assistance. The temporary Council of State did not have 
adequate resources and was not efficient in agreeing on how to manage the 
transitional government or allocate resources that were available (Lyons, 1999), 
Liberia was essentially a failed state. It lacked a capable policing force, a functional 
judicial system, adequate medical facilities, a working educational system, and basic 
infrastructure. The country relied on foreign assistance to provide security, maintain 
order and alleviate the humanitarian crisis. Various foreign state and non-
governmental donors gave support to Liberia and made up for the state's 
shortcomings to enable the holding of elections under severely challenging 
conditions. USAID gave money to purchase needed election materials, including 
ballots; fund the International Foundation for Electoral Systems to provide technical 
assistance; and retain the services of other organizations to assist in the upcoming 
elections (Lyons, 1999). Most prominent among those USAID-funded organizations 
were the Carter Center, the Friends of Liberia, Refugee Policy Group, the Academy 
for Educational Development, and the National Democratic Institute (Lyons, 
1999:53). 
The United Nations served several significant roles throughout Liberia's 
transitional period. UNOMIL was operating under a mixed mandate that, as of 2005, 
focused primarily on support for ECOW AS and the Liberian transitional government 
in implementing the peace agreement (UNSC, 1997b). The mandate also included 
verifying disarmament and demobilization of combatants; giving humanitarian 
assistance; and observing and verifying the election process, in consultation with the 
OAU and ECOWAS (UNSC, I 997b). The UNOMIL peacekeeping effort was an 
experimental approach and the first of its kind where ECOW AS, the local sub-
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regional organization, took the lead and the UN provided backup (Lyons, 1999:53). 
ECOWAS, which had led the peacekeeping efforts throughout Liberia's civil 
war, also led the effort in conducting Liberia's election preparation. While much of 
the funding was provided by non-African donors, bringing peace and democratically 
elected leadership to Liberia was an African initiative. 
While the state of Liberia lacked basic institutions and had little time to 
rebuild before the elections, significant progress was made when, on April 7, 1997, 
the reconstituted Supreme Court was installed to adjudicate in electoral disputes 
(UNSC, 1997b). Furthermore, the Independent Electoral Commission (IECOM) was 
also installed on April of 1997, consisting of civilian, women's rights, and union 
representatives. The IECOM faced several challenges, including the screening and 
employing of election officials, the deployment of county authorities to administer the 
law, and the high turnover rate for registration and polling station workers (Lyons, 
1999:52). Adding to the challenges, vast areas of the country were difficult to reach 
during the rainy season due to poor infrastructure (Lyons, 1999). In addition, Basic 
demographic information was unavailable. as most citizens lacked valid 
documentation showing nationality or age, and many of the polling and registration 
places required rebuilding (Lyons, 1999). However, the rebuilding of the state and 
return to order steadily progressed while momentum was maintained as the country 
approached the election date. 
3.4.3 Political Parties and Choices 
By early 1997, militia leaders transformed their organizations into political 
parties in order to participate in the upcoming elections (Lyons, 1998). Most notably. 
the NPFL, still under the leadership of Charles Taylor, converted to the NPP 
(National Patriotic Party), ULIMO-K became ALCOP (All Liberian Coalition Party) 
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and LPC leaders led the late Samuel Doe's NDPL (National Democratic Party of 
Liberia) (Lyons, 1998). Already established political organizations restructured to 
form the Alliance of Political Parties (APP) (Lyons, 1998). Most notable among the 
non-militia parties was the Unity Party led bv Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. which briefly 
joined the APP, but later withdrew to run independently (Lyons, 1998). 
Sirleafs Unity Party rapidly emerged as the most significant threat to 
frontrunner Charles Taylor (Lyons, 1998). The APP, and several smaller parties, 
proved ineffective and disbanded after it became apparent that they were unable to 
garner sufficient support (Lyons, 1998). The remaining parties appeared unlikely to 
win the election but could draw enough support to prevent either Sirleaf or Taylor 
from reaching over 50 percent of the votes and thus requiring a runoff election 
(Lyons, 1999:51). 
Although Sirleaf was gaining popular support, Taylor had substantially greater 
support networks and resources than did other candidates. Most of Taylor's resource 
and organizational advantages came from networks Taylor had built throughout war-
time and resources he controlled through leading the rebellion (Lyons, 1998). While 
war-torn Liberia as a whole lacked communication and transportation networks, 
Taylor's NPP operated Liberia's old state-run radio station and had busses, 
motorbikes, a helicopter, and a fleet of Land Rovers at their disposal (Lyons, 1998). 
Also, through its networks, Taylor's party handed out food to the people and 
promised possible government positions to local leaders for their support (Lyons, 
1998). 
Taylor's campaign tactics and spending arguably violated election law, which 
limited spending in order to level the plaving field among candidates. But. due to 
limited oversight and undeveloped implementation and control mechanisms, the 
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bodies responsible of oversight failed to restrict Taylor and thus unfairly permitted 
him to spend without restraint (UNSC, 1997b). Furthermore, Taylor was not 
prevented from holding onto and utilizing the resources that he had seized throughout 
the civil war, regardless of whether they were seized illegally (UNSC, 1997b). 
Many Liberian voters did not select candidates based on differences In 
political platforms but chose based on who they believed could bring peace to the 
country. The platforms and rhetoric of both leading candidates, Taylor and Sirleaf, 
were very similar as both candidates focused on rebuilding the country, gaining 
economic strength and pursuing reconciliation (Lyons, 1998). However, voters 
feared that unless Taylor was elected as president, he would pick up arms again and 
reignite the civil war. Because maintaining peace was the prime concern, Taylor was 
considered safer as president than as a failed candidate. regardless of ECOMOG's 
presence or his agreement in the Abuja Accord to peacefully accept electoral defeat 
(Lyons, 1999). Sirleaf's efforts to play on voter's emotions by reminding people of 
Taylor's war record and the atrocities caused by his militia, thus reopening emotional 
war wounds, failed and even backfired. Since Sirleaf failed to convince the public 
that, if elected, she could prevent a defeated Taylor from returning to fighting, her 
tactics may have scared even more people into voting for Taylor (Lyons, 1999:51). 
3.5 Timing 
The timing for elections was determined through the Abuja Accords and was 
set for May 30, 1997, allowing only nine months following the peace agreement to 
prepare the country for such a daunting task. With the help of foreign donors and the 
efforts of ECOWAS, the UN, and countless NGO's, Liberia's preparedness for 
elections was steadily progressing. But, as the scheduled election date of May 30, 
1997 approached, international observers, as well as most of the political parties, 
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started to acknowledge insufficient progression toward readying Liberia for elections 
(Bekoe, 2008:127). The short timetable and subsequent lack of adequate preparation 
caused a crisis that threatened to destabilize the peace process. 
The Elections Commission, as well as UNOMIL, found that insufficient time 
was available to adequately prepare the country for the elections (UNSC, 1997:2). 
While the security conditions were considered adequate, delays in preparations meant 
that it was not technically feasible to conduct elections on May 30, 1997 (UNSC, 
1997:3). All political candidates other than Charles Taylor were in favor of 
postponing the election date until sometime in October (Carter Center, 1997:22-23; 
Bekoe, 2008:127). Taylor, who was the leading candidate at the time and stood to 
gain little from a later election date, opposed postponement and demanded to go 
forward with the elections on the scheduled date (Bekoe, 2008: 127). Taylor had 
created a far-reaching network prior to the peace agreement and consequently enjoyed 
vast resources and wide-spread name recognition. A rushed election timetable with a 
short campaign season was in Taylor's favor, as it limited the time for other political 
candidates to establish political networks, amass resources, and reach out to voters 
(Paris, 2004). 
In response to the demands to postpone elections. Tavlor threatened that 
abandoning the agreed upon election date would violate the peace agreement and he 
would then not be required to act in accordance with the Abuja agreement (Bekoe. 
2008: 127). While asserting the right to the final decision, ECOWAS's leadership 
initially opposed postponement of the elections (Bekoe, 2008: 127). In addition, 
several West African donor countries threatened to withdraw support if the election 
date was changed (Lyons, 1999:48-49; Bekoe, 2008:127). 
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The crisis brought on by the rushed election timing led initially to uncertainty 
but resulted in a compromise. While most political parties and many observers 
advocated postponement until October, ECOWAS's leadership ruled to push the 
election date back to Julv 19. 1997 (Bekoe. 2008: 127). Holding the election in July 
sti11left a very short time for political candidates to catch up to Taylor's lead and pose 
a real threat to his winning the election, thus making the postponement acceptable for 
Taylor and his party (Bekoe, 2008). 
3.6 Elections 
Voter registration was scheduled for June 24 through June 31, 1997 (Lyons, 
1999:52). Because of limited time for planning, preparation, and training, the 
registration process started out inefficient and disorganized (Lyons, 1999:52). 
However, the lECOM quickly adapted and overcame initial problems with increased 
efficiency, in addition to extending the voter registration period until July 3, 1997 
(Lyons, 1999:52). 
ECOMOG, which was considered to be politically neutral, patrolled every 
registration location and maintained constant presence and security (Lyons, 1999:52). 
Considering the poor planning, rushed timing, and limited training or previous 
experience, the workers quickly grasped the registration process and showed great 
commitment in spite of their poor working environment (Lyons, 1999:52). 
Foreign election observers, as well as observers from political parties, 
monitored the registration sites and challenged registration errors and unqualified 
prospective voters (Lyons, 1999:52). However, political parties were not evenly 
represented by observers, as only Taylor's NPP had sufficient resources to widely 
monitor registration sites (Lvons. 1999:52). Despite the discrepancy in partv observer 
39 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
representation, registration disputes were rare and were mostly limited to not meeting 
the age requirement or lacking proper identification (Lyons, 1999:52). 
Even though registration wasn't flawless and some people weren't able to 
register after sites ran out of registration forms, such instances were not the norm and 
most citizens in Liberia who wanted to register were able to do so (Lyons, 1999:52). 
At around 750,000, registration turnout was less than expected, yet still respectable 
(Lyons, 1999:52). While there were allegations that registration cards were being 
sold and traded and allegations that people not old enough to vote were being 
registered, there were no indications of widespread, organized fraud (Lyons, 
1999:52). The fact that areas formerlv controlled bv. and thus favoring. Tavlor had 
significantly higher than expected registration rates while areas that were not 
previously held by Taylor, most notably greater Monrovia, had significantly lower 
than expected registration rates raised suspicions but was not found to be fraudulent 
(Lyons, 1999:52). 
When election day came on July 19, 1997, over 80 percent of registered voters 
made their way to the polling places and exerci sed their right to vote (Lyons, 1998). 
Tn general, polling places were well stocked with sufficient ballots. The vast majority 
of polling places opened punctually and had lines of people waiting by the time they 
opened (Lyons, 1999:56). Virtually all polling places throughout Liberia were 
secured by African peacekeeping forces (Lyons, 1999:56). Throughout the country, 
observers from political parties, NGOs, and local officials monitored voting in nearly 
all polling places and challenged errors and inconstancies to minimize the risk of 
fraud (Lyons, \999:56). In addition to local observers, nearly 500 foreign observers 
monitored the process (Lyons, 1998). 
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Overall, the voting process was well organized with no major issues that 
would impact the outcome of the election, as was the consensus from national and 
foreign observers (Adebajo, 2002b). Reports by UNOMIL, ECOWAS, the Carter 
Center, Friends of Liberia and others generally stated that despite some setbacks and 
difficulties, the elections were generally free and fair and marked a major milestone 
for Liberia. 
The outcome of the election was decisive. Former rebel leader Charles Taylor 
received over 75 percent of the votes, while his closest competitor Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf only received 10 percent of the votes (Lyons, 1998). Taylor's landslide 
victory, combined with the widespread praise of the process, left little doubt that the 
outcome represented the will of the people. Regardless, Sirleaf initially alleged 
widespread fraud and irregularities. She later rescinded her allegations and focused 
on her party's upcoming role as the primary political opposition to Taylor's regime 
(Lyons, 1998). Without further challenges, Taylor was officially sworn into office in 
early August, 1997. 
3.7 Aftermath 
The seemingly successful election was the final step in completing the Abuja 
peace process and. at least for the time being. terminated the protracted and 
devastating civil war (Lyons, 1998). Following the election and subsequent swearing 
in of president-elect Taylor, the UNOMIL and ECOMOG operations were generally 
deemed to be successes. Soon after, the UN and ECOW AS promptly evacuated the 
majority of their forces and non-military personnel from Liberia (UNSC, 1997). The 
weeks following the inauguration were comparatively calm, and hopes among citizens 
and observers for a new era of long-sought prosperity and peace in Liberia were high 
(Alao, 1999; Paris, 2004). 
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Taylor initially vowed to fonn a government that represented all Liberians, 
regardless of ethnicity or affiliation. Following through with his promise, President 
Taylor selected members from rival political parties to join his cabinets and started a 
commission to deal with human rights violations and one to further reconciliation 
(Lyons, 1998). Foreign reporters praised Taylor's efforts at incorporating non-NPFL 
personnel through government appointments. but criticized appointments of some 
fonner NPFL loyalists who faced allegations of brutality and acts of cruelty 
committed during the civil war (Lyons, 1998). 
Some of Taylor's choices indicated that his aim was not advancing democracy 
but entrenching NPFL's hold on power. Initial red flags included harassment of news 
organizations for critical reporting as well as close monitoring of political opposition 
and other perceived threats (Lyons, 1998). This practice escalated and. over the 
following years, Taylor had virtually eliminated both open political opposition and 
Liberian media reports critical of his actions by continually monitoring, threatening, 
and arresting media personnel and others who were publicly outspoken against the 
NPFL (Farah, 2001 b; Paris, 2004). 
Despite international criticism, Taylor rejected a clause in the Abuja 
agreement which assigned the rebuilding of Liberia's military to ECOMOG (Lyons, 
1998). Under President Taylor, the newly rebuilt national military was in part made 
up of fonner NPFL fighters and inclusion in the military was often based on ethnicity 
(Lyons, 1998). Taylor also established an anti-terrorist military unit, which primarily 
consisted of his loyal and reliable fonner NPP rebel fighters. The anti-terrorist unit 
allegedly engaged in several assaults on Taylor's political opposition leaders and is 
considered responsible for high-profile killings of leaders that Taylor perceived as a 
threat to his power (Paris. 2004). In light of the constant threats and closed political 
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space, many community and political leaders either quieted down or moved out of 
Liberia (Paris, 2004). 
As a result of Taylor's repressive and paranoid policies, the ruling regime 
lacked oversight and accountability as well as a political opposition and limits to 
power through strong and independent legislative or judiciary branches of government 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002; Paris, 2004). In other words, Taylor took advantage of 
his authority and sought not to further democracy but to broaden his power; eliminate 
criticism, oversight, and opposition; and thus reduce the threat of losing future 
elections while continually declaring Liberia to be a democracy - even if Liberia was 
a democracy only in name (Lyons, 1999; Paris, 2004). 
3.8 Analysis 
What conclusions can be drawn from this case to address the research 
question: Should post-conflict elections be held early or should they be delayed until 
the country is in a better position to manage the impacts of elections? 
As this paper has argued, to advance the long-term goals of sustainable peace 
and development, post -conflict elections should not be held hastily but should follow 
a period of rebuilding. The transitional period allows for the provision of adequate 
security, institution building, proper planning and preparation of elections, 
development of political parties, etc. Furthermore, when the transitional period, 
mandated by the peace agreement, allows enough time to strengthen institutions, 
create a secure environment, and develop competing party representation prior to 
election day, then holding elections is more likely to simultaneously advance war 
termination as well as democratization (Lyons, 1999:2). The Liberian conflict and the 
Abuja peace process necessitated expedient elections to take place while impatient 
leaders still had control over fighters, thereby allowing the basic components of war 
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to remain unchanged. Under those conditions, it was impossible to successfully 
promote war termination and. at the same time. promote sustainable democratization 
(Lyons, 1999:3). Therefore, in light of a compromising solution with no feasible ideal 
conclusion, ending the war took precedence over delivering sustainable 
democratization. (Lyons, 1999). Since the long-term approach required for 
democratization was not possible, the elections were primarily aimcd at war 
termination. 
The conditions necessary to promote rushed elections aimed at war 
termination were in place. First, security was adequate. Reports of violence and 
fighting during campaigning were minimal, as all major parties were committed to 
peaceful election. International forces under the leadership of UNOMIL and 
ECOW AS efIectively contained violent outbreaks and maintained peace. On election 
day. international ECOMOG forces had a far-reaching presence throughout the 
country with armed officers at nearly every polling station. 
Secondly, the momentum and rapid progression following the Abuja II peace 
agreement kept the vital parties interested in the process and prevented them from 
returning to violence. A short timeframe for elections and apparent progress helped 
maintain momentum and keep the necessary parties engaged in the process. The 
second Abuja peace agreement brought both warring parties and private citizens a 
renewed sense of hope for a final end to the civil war. 
Thirdly, all necessary political parties were participating in the election 
process and embracing the process with no serious interruptions bv potential spoilers. 
Most notably, Taylor, the former spoiler to the peace process, transformed his military 
apparatus into an "effective mass-mobilizing political party, replacing guns with 
patronage and roadblocks with rallies" (Kumar, 1998: 192). 
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Given the short transitional period between the peace agreement and the 
elections, the conditions were only suitable for the limited goal of war tennination. 
There were several unfavorable conditions at the time of elections that could hinder 
long-tenn sustainable peace and democratization. Firstly, inadequate institution 
building resulted in a weak state devoid of procedural nonns, government oversight, 
checks on executive power, independent judiciary, etc. Although the election 
returned the virtually lawless country to constitutional rule and legally restricted the 
power of the President, institutions were too weak and Taylor's power became 
virtually unchecked. Therefore, the regime under Taylor did not act as a democratic 
political parity and did not follow constitutional constraints placed on the office of the 
President. 
Secondly, Liberia was incapable of sustaining itself and was effectively 
dependent on foreign support. The international community, which provided Liberia 
the necessary financial, technical, security, and humanitarian support to maintain 
stability prior to the elections, was eager to withdraw after installation of indigenous 
leadership was complete. Most foreign actors withdrew support and exited Liberia 
shortly after President Taylor's swearing into office. 
Thirdly, the short timeframe for national elections did not allow for proper 
development of political parities. The limited time was adequate for existing military 
operations, which benefited from war-time support and resources, to transfonn into 
political parties. However, there was not sufficient time for the necessary 
development of viable opposition that did not have preexisting war-time networks and 
resources. As a result, the dominant political party was merely a transfonnation of the 
leading war-time militia. Furthermore, challenging political parties and a system of 
open political opposition did not become entrenched and were consequently easily 
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suppressed after the installment of the new regime. President Taylor's suppression of 
political opponents and perceived threats effectively reversed any progress toward 
democracy achieved through the 1997 elections. 
In addition to being considered free and fair and hailed as a success, the 
elections achieved the immediate goal of war termination. In order to accomplish the 
limited goal of war termination, thc rushcd timing was appropriate and proved to be 
effective. However, weak institutions and unchecked power of the newly elected 
president allowed him to rule Liberia as a democracy only in name. The weak 
rebuilding effort and subsequently weak institutions, lack of entrenched procedures 
and guidelines, lack of independence of government branches, lack of oversight, and 
lack of checks on executive power put in place leadership capable of authoritarian 
rule and did not further democratization or sustainable peace. As Roland Paris 
(2004:93) stated, "the holding of a reasonably successful election does not 
demonstrate that liberalization has fostered the conditions for a stable and lasting 
peace in Liberia" 
3.9 Conclusion 
The timing of Liberia's 1997 post-conflict election played a significant role in 
the short term success and long term implications of the election. 
The election was successful in achieving war termination. The timing was 
appropriate to achieve the goal and proved to be effective. It is likely that if the 
elections had been significantly delayed participants would have boycotted the 
process and reignited violent conflict. 
However, the election was not successful in advancing the objectives of 
peacebuilding, which are to enable sustainable peace and development, and further 
long-term democratization. Shortly after being sworn into office, President Taylor 
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abandoned liberal politics and ruled through coercion, fear, and force. Consequently, 
fighting resumed only a few years after the election and Liberia returned to a state of 
civil war. The rushed schedule to hold elections and put indigenous leadership in 
charge of the state contributed to the failure to produce sustainable peace and 
development. The short transitional period following the peace agreement prevented 
adequate institutional stability, including checks on executive power and open 
opposition. Such shortcomings allowed the President to practice absolute rule and 
eventual Iv led to violent internal opposition and recidivism of civil war. 
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Chapter Four: Liberia's 2005 Election 
4.1 The Second Liberian Civil War 
Interwar peace in Liberia lasted only a short time and could be a misnomer, as 
it was not necessarily peaceful. The National Democratic Institute (2004:7) describes 
how "for six years following Liberia's 1997 national election, Taylor's government 
routinely persecuted opposition figures, human rights activists, the press and members 
of civil society." The former rebel leader's style of governing shared many aspects of 
the previous regime, which Taylor rallied against and fought so vigorously. Also 
resembling previous leaders, Taylor's government was plagued with corruption, 
which siphoned public funds to create personal wealth for the President, his 
patronage, and many other elites (NOI, 2004:7). While political opposition from 
within Liberia was limited, opposition movements headquartered in neighboring 
countries were organizing and preparing for action. Furthermore, the international 
community exerted pressure on President Taylor for his actions regarding illegal 
diamond exports, weapons trading, and his involvement in the conf1ict in neighboring 
Sierra Leone. The international community initially withheld support from the 
Liberian government and in 2001 imposed sanctions on the non-cooperative state 
(NOI, 2004:7). 
An organized rebellion opposing Taylor's regime and governance, Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), entered Liberia from their 
headquarters in neighboring Guinea in 2000 (NOI, 2004). Counteracting LURD's 
invasion, President Taylor called 15,000 troops to arms (Paris, 2004:95) and ordered 
them to intercept the rebels, which lead to the Second Liberian Civil War (Kieh, 
2009). 
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According to George Kieh, Jr. (2009), the underlying causes that motivated 
and enabled the rebel opposition and the outbreak of conflict can be grouped into two 
categories. The first category concerns the failure to properly disarm, demobilize, and 
re-integrate former fighters (Kieh, 2009). The second category concerns the failure of 
President Taylor to adequately manage and alleviate the causes that led to civil war in 
the first place. These causes include "the violation of human rights, economic 
deprivation and inequities, and social malaise" (Kieh, 2009: 10). Compounding these 
issues were the inconsistencies and overall deficiencies in foreign development aid. 
Liberia relied on foreign assistance for its reconstruction of government institutions as 
well as public services programs. Without continued foreign aid Liberia's rebuilding 
efforts were delayed and basic social services were not delivered, causing resentment 
of the Liberian people toward the ruling regime, particularly among Liberia's rural 
population. 
Following the successful invasion, LURD militias quickly advanced toward 
Monrovia. The rebel group often threatening to advance into the capital city. 
LURD's actions led to a humanitarian crisis, marked by vast numbers of people 
fleeing their homes in search of refuge (ND!, 2004). Adding to the complexity of the 
conflict, in 2002 a group of rebels separated from LURD to form an independent rebel 
militia called the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) (ND!, 2004). 
Taylor declared Liberia to be in a state of emergency from February to 
September of 2002, during which period the right to assembly and other civil rights 
were denied. The rebels Quicklv gained ground and eventually controlled most of the 
county outside of Monrovia (ITCJ, 2006), causing roughly 75 percent of the 
population to flee their homes in search of refuge either within Monrovia or outside of 
the country (ND!, 2004:7). Reminiscent of the First Liberian Civil War, the country 
49 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
was plagued with violent crime including murder, mutilation, rape and the use of 
children as soldiers (NDI, 2004:7). 
4.2 Attempts at Peace 
President Taylor's term in office was to expire in late 2003 but, as expressed 
by the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) and United States Ambassador 
John Blaney, Liberia did not have the necessary conditions to conduct free and fair 
elections (LH&I, 2003). Blaney further warned that the US would "not recognize the 
results of any fraudulent election" (LH&I, 2003). 
Sierra Leone indicted Liberian President Charles Taylor for war cnmes, 
including crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law, 
on June 4, 2003, and issued a warrant for Taylor's arrest. Taylor resigned from the 
presidency and took asylum in Nigeria on August 11, 2003 (NDI, 2004:8). On 
August 18, 2003, the Liberian government, LURD and MODEL rebel forces, and 18 
political parties entered into a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
The CPA provided a plan for the peace process, established the National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and designated leadership roles within 
the NTGL (Cook, 2005). Included in the peace process, the CPA elaborated on the 
organizational structure and scope of the NTGL, which was intended to prepare 
Liberia for democratic elections in late 2005, allowing for a two-year long transitional 
period (NDI, 2004:8). The CPA stipulated that the NTGL was to include a legislative 
assembly comprised of representatives from the formerly ruling NPP, along with 
LURD, MODEL, and various other political parties and civil society organizations 
(NDI, 2004:8). The NTGL was officially in control of the state as of 14 October. 
2003, with well-known business leader Gyude Bryant serving as Chairman of the 
transitional governing authority (NDI, 2004:8). The NTGL's primary objectives were 
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to implement the CPA and prepare Liberia for the October 2005 elections, which 
included rebuilding state institutions, delivering essential social services, and 
promoting reconciliation (ND!, 2005:44). 
Immediately after the instatement of the CPA, ECOW AS deployed 
peacekeepers under Nigerian leadership to stabilize Monrovia. Months later, the UN 
established the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and deployed 15,000 
additional peacekeepers to stabilize the rest of Liberia (ND!, 2004:8). 
4.3 Conditions Prior to Elections 
4.3.1 Security 
An early UN assessment (UNSC, 2004) of Liberia's situation and needs for rebuilding 
the state listed establishing security as the most urgent priority. Furthermore, the 
international community recognized that disarmament and demobilization of 
combatants was vital to creating a stable environment in which to conduct elections 
(UNSC, 2004:25). According to the UN (UNSC, 2005:31), over 100,000 combatants 
were disarmed and demobilized while nearly 30,000 light weapons and 35,000 heavy 
munitions, in addition to 6.5 million pieces of ammunition were retrieved. 
Disarmament and demobilization concluded in November of 2004, at which point the 
organized militias were officially considered to be disbanded (UNSC, 2005:30). Full 
implementation of the ceasefire agreement was achieved with the completion of 
disarmament and the disbandment of organized militias (UNSC, 2005:46). The 
continuous progression in stabilizing the state and readying it for the October 2005 
elections brought optimism about successfully implementing the CPA and holding 
peaceful, democratic elections. To complete the implementation of the CPA, Liberia 
had to rebuild government institutions, bring stability to the state, hold elections and 
inaugurate the president. 
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UNMIL's anned forces supported the Liberian National Police as well as the 
government's customs and immigration services (UNSC, 2005:23). UNMIL setup 
checkpoints along Liberia's borders as well as within the state to surveil and control 
the movement of people and weapons (UNSC, 2005). The UN mission also 
investigated illegal weapons and diamond trading and carried out search and seizure 
operations for weapons and ammunition (UNSC, 2005). 
To centralize authority, the National Liberian Police and the military were 
restructured, and the police's reach and presence were extended to all counties 
throughout Liberia (UNSC, 2005:34). While the restructuring of the police forces 
made steady progress, the restructuring of the military was hampered by the state's 
limited budget and inability to pay the retirement payments of current servicemen 
(UNSC, 2005). While transitional government and foreign actors made continual 
progress toward security, setbacks in reorganizing the military and reintegrating 
former fighters into society added to the fragility of peace (UNSC, 2005:47). 
With national and foreign troops present throughout Liberia, campaigning 
began in a relatively stable security environment, although some small incidents 
brought fear about the outbreak of violence (ND!, 2005:38). Such incidents were 
typically clashes between supporters of opposing political parties and usually limited 
to verbal assaults and non-lethal street fights (ND!, 2005:38). Though there were 
cases of violence, violent outbreaks were resolved quickly and remained localized 
without spreading across Liberia (ICG, 2005:17). To quell such incidents, and deter 
more from occurring or escalating into widespread fighting, leaders of political 
parties, the National Election Commission (NEC), and the police force worked 
together to organIze political rallies of supporters and discourage outbreaks of 
violence (ND!, 2005:38). 
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Due to combined efforts of the NEC, UNMIL, ECOW AS, the Liberian 
National Police (LNP) and local officials, the security prior to elections was sufficient 
to deter major outbreaks of violence (IRI, 2005). Peacekeeping forces worked with 
the Liberian security forces and established specific plans for providing security and 
sharing responsibility in order to create a safe environment on election day (UNSC, 
2005b:14). The NTGL had over 4,000 police officers patrolling polling stations 
throughout the country, 1,800 were taught and outfitted by the UN. UN forces were 
concentrated in key areas and also carried out patrols that reached across Liberia's 
border to prevent saboteurs from entering the country (UNSC, 2005b:14). While all 
attempts failed, Taylor loyalists, cabinet members, and legislators who were barred 
from running for office did try to stir up unrest and sabotage the peace process 
(UNSC, 2005:38). 
The advancements in Liberia's security were real and the state was relatively 
stable, but the overall level of security was tenuous throughout the period of 
transitional governance. However, by the time of the elections, over 15,000 
peacekeepers were spread th oughout Liberia providing a significant deterrent to 
potential spoilers and agitators in a nation of only a few million citizens (lCG, 
2005:17). The initial guarantee of retaining peacekeeping forces was a significant 
factor in enabling the incoming Liberian regime to reassert the rule of law (ICG, 
2005:17). 
4.3.2 Institutional Strength 
Liberia was governed by a transitional authority from October 2003 until the 
inauguration of the new leadership in January 2006, as laid out in the CPA. The 
inclusive CPA was agreed on by all major parties to the war (the government of 
Liberia, LURD, and MODEL) and garnered much support from political and civil 
53 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
society leaders. The CPA's major accomplishment was the establishment of the 
National Transitional Govermnent of Liberia (NTGL), which would govern the 
country for over two years and prepare Liberia for popular elections in late 2005. 
Because the UN recognized the significance of returning power to the 
govermnent and broadening the government's reach throughout Liberia, UNMIL sent 
civil affairs officers to work throughout the country in federal agencies and 
govermnent run businesses (UNSC, 2004:24). Much emphasis was put on reforming 
the security sector and "re-establishing justice and the rule of law, with ministers of 
the National Transitional Govermnent identifYing training and infrastructure for law 
enforcement agencies as particular priorities" (UNSC, 2004:24). The civil affairs 
officers made great impact on restoring state authority throughout the country, where 
prior to the CPA the state had only tentative control of Monrovia and areas in the 
capital's immediate vicinity (UNSC, 2005:24). 
The mission's Legal and Judicial Support Unit assisted the Liberian Ministry 
of Justice to return the country to the rule of law (UNSC, 2005:24). The efforts to 
regenerate the Liberian legal system continued to make "steady progress" (UNSC, 
2005b:45). Examples of such progress include appointments of 20 new circuit court 
and magistrate judges. Also, structures and facilities have been improved or built 
anew where necessary, including 13 court renovation projects (UNSC, 2005b:45). 
In addition to courthouses, the United Nations mission also focused on 
improving correctional facilities and the conditions for both prison employees and 
prisoners (UNSC, 2005b:47). The World Food Programme (WFP), ICRC and other 
organizations aided the correctional facilities with food rations, bedding, and other 
necessities. The United States and Norway gave further financial support for the 
rebuilding of prisons and training of prison personnel (UNSC, 2005b:47). 
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A state-wide census of government employees was taken, which allowed the 
NTGL to reduce its bloated payroll and eliminate "ghost workers" (UNSe, 
2005b:50). To further reduce unnecessary government spending and to fight 
corruption, the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme 
(GEMAP) was launched with support ofUNMIL and UNDP (UNSe 2005b: para 55). 
GEMAP proved to be an effective program and delivered strong results in making the 
government function more efficiently and in freeing up assets and resources for the 
state. GEMAP further enabled the transitional government in beginning the long 
process to "rebuild the economy, create employment, and deliver education and health 
services to the people of Liberia" (UNSe, 2005b:57). To curb corruption, theft and 
embezzlement, government agencies took inventories of state-owned assets in 
preparation of the newly elected regime (UNSe, 2005b:56). 
During the transitional period leading up to the elections, continual 
advancements were achieved in restoring and solidifying government authority 
throughout the country, especially in the reformation of government infrastructure 
(UNSe, 2005b:49). USAID and other foreign organizations supported construction 
and rehabilitation of government administration buildings throughout the county. 
Approximately half of the projects were completed by the time of the elections 
(UNSe, 2005b:49). The various functional administration buildings and improved 
government infrastructure allowed the NTGL to accommodate and compensate 
government employees and other civil servants (UNSe, 2005b:45). 
Furthermore, the institutional capabilities of the NEe steadily progressed and 
improved. According to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(ND!, 2005:39), "in the short time since its formation, the NEe drafted the electoral 
legal framework, organized a voter registration effort widely accepted as credible, 
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created an environment for peaceful campalgmng, issued necessary guidelines to 
supplement the election law, initiated a massive voter education program, planned 
training for election officials and produced election materials such as ballots." Further 
progress was evident in the implementation of a Political Parties' Code of Conduct 
and in citizens' and candidates' enthusiasm for the political process (N0l, 2005). 
However, while the NTGL made great strides during the two-year transitional 
period leading up to the elections, Liberia was still a post-conflict state in the process 
of rebuilding and thus lacked sufficient facilities and trained staff to operate 
effectively (UNSC, 2005b:45). Liberia's rebuilding efforts were hampered by lost 
potential revenue, primarily due to economic sanctions placed on Liberian timber and 
diamonds. While the transitional government lobbied the UN to lift sanctions, civil 
society leaders urged that sanctions remain in place until a system providing adequate 
oversight and transparency in lumber and diamond industries was put in place. The 
UN agreed that the sanctions on timber and diamonds would only be lifted "once the 
markets had been regulated and Liberia [instituted] a transparent and internationally 
verifiable diamond certification program" (UNSC, 2005:28). 
4.3.3 Political Parties and Choices 
The two-year transitional period allowed for a more inclusive development of 
political parties than the considerably shorter period following the First Liberian Civil 
War. More than 20 political parties emerged as contenders for the national elections, 
giving Liberian voters abundant options. Because voters had to choose among such a 
wide pool of registered candidates and parties, many prospective voters became 
bewildered about which candidates best represented their interests and what the major 
differences among the choices were (N0l, 2005:41). However, publicly held local 
and national debates among candidates for the presidency, as well as the legislature, 
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allowed the candidates to state their positions and allowed the voters access to the 
candidates and opportunity to voice questions or concerns (NDI, 2005:41). Also, 
recordings were broadcast over the radio and transcripts or summaries were available 
in print to many citizens, even in rural areas. 
Party organization was generally centralized within Monrovia and most parties 
lacked the means to carry out a comprehensive grassroots campaign in all counties 
(NDI, 2005:41). As was the case in 1997, political parties and the differences between 
them tended to evolve based on the personalities of the candidates, instead of on the 
basis of political position, philosophy, opinions or issues (NDI, 2005:41). 
Months before the 2005 election, all major participating political candidates 
committed to the Political Parties' Code of Conduct (NDI, 2005:41). "The code of 
conduct determined rules of engagement, established the standards of acceptable 
behavior, and [sought] to promote a peaceful and legitimate electoral process" (NDI, 
2005:41). The signing of the code of conduct was voluntary, not mandatory, and was 
precedent setting for Liberia. The agreeing of the parties and candidates to adhere to 
the code was an act of good faith and a vote of confidence in the democratic process. 
The coming together of candidates and parties to agree on the process signaled hope 
for democratic advancement in Liberia This development signaled encouragement 
for successful elections by showing the candidates' commitment to support honest 
and open campaigns with transparency and oversight and denounce political violence 
and intimidation tactics. 
Finally, campaign finance rules enacted for 2005 election were widely 
considered "a positive development for the evolution of democratic practices III 
Liberia" and "among the most comprehensive worldwide" (NDI, 2005:39). 
4.4 Timing 
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The international community recognized the significance of not only holding 
elections to end the Second Liberian Civil War but also making progress toward 
democratization and enabling sustainable peace. To make such progress, the 
developments in preparation for the election were aimed at increasing security and 
rebuilding the state, in addition to bringing in new leadership. Therefore, the 
scheduled regular elections following President Taylor's term were cancelled. After 
President Taylor's departure, the CPA called for a 2-year transitional government to 
ready the country before national elections would be held in October 2005. Unlike 
the rushed election in 1997, the two-year transitional period allowed for necessary 
security improvements, the rebuilding of the state and government institutions, 
developments of political parties, and the development of conditions favorable for 
free and fair elections. Foreign actors involved in the rebuilding effort cited concerns 
about supplying resources and personnel to promote another election in unfavorable 
conditions that promised only dubious results. 
The international community and Liberian participants alike agreed upon the 
significance of holding transparent elections in favorable conditions that would be 
regarded as free and fair, and they were committed to doing so by October 2005 
(UNSC, 2004:27). The newly established NEC was in charge of preparing the 
elections. The NEC received technical assistance from the UN. Other support, 
including election observers, was provided by ECOW AS, the AU, and the EU 
(UNSC, 2004:27). 
The UN acknowledged that, for the NEC to operate effectively, the 
development of the NEC's fiscal, logistical, and technical capabilities were of great 
importance (UNSC, 2004:27). According to a UN Security Council report (UNSC, 
2004:27) some of the NEC's major challenges included "voter registration and civic 
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education and strengthening civil society's role in elections, as well as the core tasks 
of planning the organization and conduct of the elections." 
Throughout the two-year transitional period and with great international 
assistance, Liberia progressed steadily in several key areas including security, 
reduction in violence, rebuilding of state institutions, development of political parties, 
voter education, and general return to a relatively stable life for most Liberians. 
Given the positive improvement of the country, the timing of elections seemed to be 
appropriate. Except for a potentially detrimental legal complication raised by the 
Supreme Court, there were few concerns which could have prompted a postponement 
or rescheduling of the 2005 elections. 
Less than three weeks prior to the election date, Liberia's Supreme Court 
heard several election related cases and rendered one ruling that resulted in significant 
changes in voting procedure and nearly required postponement of elections (ND!, 
2005). In the ruling, the Supreme Court overruled a standing law by allowing each 
voter to cast two votes for Senate, as each county had two senatorial seats. As a 
result, new ballots had to be printed and voters had to be reeducated about the new 
voting procedure (ND!, 2005). With the CPA requiring that the elections be held by 
October 2005, changes mandated by the Supreme Court order were implemented 
quickly and with great efficiency and did not affect the election date (UNSC, 
2005b:4). 
4.5 Elections 
Voter registration was conducted under stable conditions from April 25 to 
May 21, 2005 (ND!, 2005). The UN (UNSC, 2005:38) stated that "UNMIL's 
presence throughout Liberia, combined with enhanced security measures in 
preparation for the organization of elections, has reinforced the stability of the 
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country." In relative safety, over 1.3 million citizens registered to vote in a country of 
only around 1.5 million eligible citizens (ND!, 2(05). Distribution between male and 
female registered voters was roughly even, and over 60,000 internationally displaced 
persons registered from their displacement camps (ND!, 2005). Overall, Liberia's 
2005 voter registration was described by commentators and international observers as 
successf uJ. 
The national and local elections took place on October II, 2005, as scheduled 
(UNSC, 2005b:2). During the campaign and on election day, all 22 political parties, 
which included 22 candidates for the presidency, 205 candidates for Senate, and 513 
candidates for the House of Representatives, remained relatively peaceful and none 
were found to be in violation of the agreed upon code of conduct (UNSC, 2005b:2). 
The conduct at the polling places on election day was reported as "orderly and 
peaceful," with approximately 75 percent voter turnout (UNSC, 2005b:5). No major 
safety concerns or acts of violence were reported. Over 400 foreign election 
observers were present to report on the elections and fmd inconsistencies, 
representing the US, the United Kingdom, the EU, the AU, ECOWAS, the Carter 
Center, the National Democratic Institute, and several other international 
organizations (UNSC, 2005b). In addition, tens of thousands of unofficial party 
representatives, thousands of civil society representatives, and local media 
organizations all monitored the procedures (UNSC, 2005b:5). The general consensus 
in the reports written on the elections "characterized the elections as peaceful, orderly, 
free, fair, transparent and well-administered" (UNSC, 2005b:2). 
Because no candidate for Liberia's presidency received over 50 percent of the 
votes in the first round of the elections, a second round was held on November 8, 
2005. The second round was a runoff election between George Weah and Ellen 
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Johnson Sirleaf, the two presidential candidates who had received the most votes on 
October 11. 
The runoff campaigns, much like the campaigns for the tirst round, were 
peaceful and without major disruptions. NOl (2005) reported that intimidation 
tactics, which had been prominent in Liberian politics, were not apparent. However, 
campaign rhetoric by both candidates was often more negative, with greater focus on 
the individuals and less attention given to issues and policies, than for the October 11 
election (UNSC, 2005b:9). As the runoff election approached, the language used by 
the candidates became increasingly aggressive, which caused worries about inciting 
violence (N0l, 2005). In spite of the declining political climate, "political party 
supporters demonstrated admirable self-control at mass rallies in the final days of 
campaigning" (N0l, 2005:60) and no significant acts of violence were reported 
during the campaign or election day on November 8, 2005. 
Over 300 foreign election observers from 27 different organizations, In 
addition to over 3,500 Liberian observers, monitored the runoff election (UNSC, 
2005b: 1 0). The general consensus from the observers was that the runoff election 
was "generally free, fair and transparent" (UNSC, 2005b: 10). Nevertheless, after the 
NEC released unofficial early vote counts on November 9 showing Ms. Johnson 
Sirleaf in the lead, Mr. Weah's party claimed that the results were tainted by 
widespread fraud (UNSC, 2005b:IO). The following day Mr. Weah's party officially 
tiled its grievance with the Supreme Court and the NEC, asking that all vote counting 
be suspended until further review (UNSC, 2005b: 10). This development raised some 
fear of disenfranchisement in the elections and of outbreaks of violence around the 
capital city, as Mr. Weah' s supporters marched in the streets and staged 
demonstrations (UNSC, 2005b: 11). Security was on high alert and demonstrations 
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remained mostly nonviolent. Some outbreaks of violence did occur but were subdued 
quickly, the largest was an incident on November II, 2005, where security forces 
broke up an unruly mob of demonstrators who were throwing stones (UNSC, 
2005b:10). 
Finding no substantial evidence of Mr. Weah's allegations, the NEC 
announced on November 23, 2005, that Ms. Johnson Sirleaf had officially won 
Liberia's 2005 presidential election, receiving 59.4 percent of the votes. Over 60 
percent of registered voters cast their ballots in the runoff election (UNSC, 2005b: 13). 
On January 16, 2006, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was inaugurated as the President of 
Liberia. She is Africa's first female President. 
The success of Liberia's 2005 post-war elections served a critical role in 
Liberia's long road to peace. The democratic elections and inauguration of the newly 
elected regime were the final necessary elements in satisfYing the conditions for the 
completion of the transition period, as laid out in the 2003 CPA to end Liberia's 
Second Civil War. 
4.6 Aftermath 
After being sworn into office, President Johnson Sirleaf initiated efforts to 
bring about national reconciliation. She established a program aimed at improving 
economic governance and sought new policies that would soon deliver much needed 
goods and services to the people of Liberia (UNSC, 2005b:86). Early efforts also 
included the implementation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would 
help Liberia overcome its past by examining and documenting crimes and atrocities 
that occurred throughout the civil wars. 
The UN maintained a presence in Liberia after the inauguration of the new 
administration. Among UNIMIL's new priorities in working with the new regime 
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were to help the government devise and implement "a national judicial reform 
strategy and a funding strategy for critical areas of reform" (UNSC, 2005b:46). To 
date, UNMIL still has a significant number of personnel stationed in Liberia. 
After completing disarmament and demobilization of over 100,000 former 
fighters and helping reintegrate over 90,000 former fighters, President Johnson Sirleaf 
ended the DDRR program in July of2009 (UNSC, 2009:15). 
A recent UN report (UNSC, 2009: 12) states that "the security situation [in 
Liberia remains 1 fragile yet relatively stable" and that "law and order incidents, 
including rape and armed robbery, are prevalent." Also, occasional incidents of mob 
violence are reported, often emanating from tensions between ethnic groups (UNSC, 
2009: 12). Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. A country 
devastated by decades of war, rebuilding Liberia's economy and bridging the 
entrenched social divides will take many more years. 
4.7 Analysis 
What conclusions can be drawn from this case to address whether post-
conflict elections should be held early or should be delayed until the country is in a 
better position to manage the impacts of elections? As this paper has argued, to 
advance the long-term goals of sustainable peace and development, post-conflict 
elections should not be rushed, but should follow a period of rebuilding. The 
transitional period allows for provision of adequate security, institution building, 
proper planning and preparation of elections, development of political parties, etc. 
Furthermore, when the transitional period grants sufficient time to strengthen 
institutions, create a secure enviromnent, and develop competing party representation 
prior to election day, elections are more likely to simultaneously advance war 
termination as well as democratization (Lyons, 1999:2). The conditions leading up to 
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the election play vital roles in determining whether the process is truly democratic 
(NDl, 2005). The timing and conditions surrounding the elections are key elements 
for Liberia to break its cycle of violence and move toward democratization and 
sustainable peace. 
When President Taylor resigned his position and fled from Liberia, rebel 
movements had achieved their primary objective and immediately discontinued all 
fighting. Subsequently, the threat of immediately returning to war was relatively low. 
This allowed for an extended transitional period between the peace agreement and the 
transfer of power through democratic elections. Under these circumstances, the 
conditions were appropriate for the next round of elections to go beyond the limited 
goal of war termination and to further democratization and create an environment for 
sustainable peace. 
In the interest of creating conditions for sustainable peace, the CPA scheduled 
election for late 2005, allowing for a transitional period of over two years to prepare 
the state for elections. Unlike the rushed timing of the 1997 elections, the two-year 
transitional period allowed enough time for Liberians and the international 
community to create a stable and secure environment, strengthen state institutions, 
develop political parties, and thus create favorable conditions for democratization. 
The UN peace operation acknowledged the importance of creating a secure 
environment and the need to build strong state institutions "as necessary foundations 
for lasting peace and prosperity" (UNSC, 2004:3). 
Following so many years of civil war and mismanagement of the state, the 
challenges of rebuilding before the elections were formidable and required large 
international commitments. The UN emphasized that "major challenges had to be 
overcome to establish security in the many lawless parts of the country, disarm ex-
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combatants, and restore civil authority throughout a country that has been largely 
ungoverned for the last 15 years" (UNSC, 2004:8). Therefore, the relatively long 
period of rebuilding was necessary before holding national elections. 
As laid out in this chapter, steady progress was made throughout the transition 
periods on all main aspects of rebuilding. Although setbacks occurred, none were 
signifIcant enough to derail the \leace \lrocess or re~uire rescheduling of elections. 
Liberia and its international partners made great contributions in achieving the goals 
of the transitional period. A 2005 UN report (UNSC, 2005b:82) affirms that "the 
achievements made during the transition period, including the disarmament of a 
considerable number of combatants, the disbandment of the former armed factions, 
the establishment of a stable security environment throughout the country, the partial 
restoration of state authority in the counties, the establishing of GEMAP, have laid a 
good foundation on which the new government should build upon." At the time of 
elections, all violence was contained, security was adequate, institutions were capable, 
and political parties had developed appropriately. 
Not only did the winner of the elections get to govern the state, but she 
actually had a functioning system and existing institutions through which to govern 
the state. Through the careful planning and efforts of Liberians and international 
actors, Liberia was finally on the path of holding free, fair, and transparent elections 
that would usher in a new era of democratic rule. 
In addition to being considered free and fair and hailed as a success, the 
elections achieved not only the immediate goal of war termination but also ushered in 
a new era of democratic governance. In order to accomplish the dual goals of war 
termination and democratization, a longer period of rebuilding was required. 
4.8 Conclusion 
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The timing of Liberia's 2005 post-conflict election played a significant role in 
the short-term success and had long-term implications for the election. 
The election was successful in advancing the dual goals of democratization 
and war termination. The timing was appropriate to achieve both goals and proved to 
be effective. Because Taylor had left the country, all major parties were committed to 
rebuilding the state and establishing democratic governance through meaningful 
elections that were aimed to promote sustainable peace. Unlike the circumstances 
surrounding the peace agreement in 1997, it was not necessary to promote rushed 
elections to prevent a relapse into civil war. The appropriate decision was made to 
allow sufficient time to rebuild the state before holding elections. This ability to put 
in place a transitional government, which would oversee the rebuilding of the state 
and thus create favorable conditions for democratization, made the successful 2005 
elections possible. Throughout the two-year transitional period, the transitional 
government, with help of the international community, was able to address the 
underlying issues that led to the outbreak of war in the first place. As a result, the 
elections proved to be successful in promoting democratic governance as well as 
terminating the war and advancing the stated objectives of peacebuilding, which are 
to enable sustainable peace and development. 
Following the peace agreement and Liberia'S violent past, the success of 
Liberia's 2005 elections was necessary for the country to remain at peace. Even 
though successful and transparent elections does not automatically deliver good 
governance or prevent war, the establishment of democratic processes, greater 
political stability, hope of a brighter economic future, and increased government 
oversight certainly advances Liberia toward becoming a true democracy (IRl, 2005b). 
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According to NDI (2005), furthering democratic governance gives a country the best 
chance of attaining long-term sustained peace and development. 
While the security situation in Liberia remains fragile and sustainable peace is 
not guaranteed, several positive developments of the two-year transitional period 
deter authoritarian rule and subsequent rebel uprisings. Such developments include 
institutional stability, checks on executive power, presence of political opposition, and 
inclusive government. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions 
This work set out to address the issue of post-conflict election timing. 
Through examining the literature and studying Liberia's 1997 and 2005 elections, this 
work has sought to identify the best timing practices for post-conflict elections. 
The theoretical basis for the argument is primarily inspired by the theories and 
works of Roland Paris and Terrence Lyons. Paris (2004) asserts that a protracted 
period of rebuilding the war-tom state should precede elections. He argues that 
because elections inherently create tension and pit people against each other, the state 
should be strengthened before adding challenges brought on through elections. 
Lyons (2002) differentiates between the objectives of promoting elections. 
The differentiation is made between the limited goal of war termination and the long-
term goal of democratization. Lyons agrees that when the primary objective is to 
further democratization then a protracted transition time may be required. However, 
when time or resources are not available the priority must be shifted to the limited 
goal of war termination. Achieving war termination may in some cases require 
rushed elections in order to keep consent from belligerents and maintain momentum 
following a peace agreement (Lyons, 2002). 
Drawing from those theories, this work concludes that if the circumstances 
permit the long-term goal of democratization, then post-conflict elections should 
follow a protracted transition period. The timing of the election should be such that 
the transition period is adequate to provide favorable conditions for post-conflict 
elections. Through a long transition period, the transitional government and the 
international community can work toward improving conditions which will increase 
the likelihood for sustainable peace and development by not only achieving war 
termination but also advancing democratization. Such conditions include security, 
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institutional stability, and development of political parities. Thus, a long transition 
period is ideal. 
However, post-war situations are generally not ideal scenarIOs and may 
necessitate the acceptance of partial victories. In some cases, the peace agreement 
may demand a rushed election held in unfavorable conditions, but may serve the 
limited goal of war termination. If elections achieve the limited goal of war 
termination but fail to deliver a fully democratic regime, then the elections can still be 
considered a partial success or at least a move in the right direction. Therefore, it is 
less important to determine the ideal timing for post-conflict elections than the best 
timing under the given circumstances. 
An examination of two cases was used to demonstrate how different 
approaches yielded different results. The first case study involved Liberia's 1997 
election, which followed the First Liberian Civil War. In this case, the election was 
held only months after the peace agreement was signed. It is likely that if the 
elections had been significantly delayed to allow for a longer transition period, then 
participants would have boycotted the peace process. Therefore, the priority shifted 
from establishing a true democracy to the limited goal of war termination, which the 
rushed elections achieved. Thus, the timing was appropriate to end the war but was 
not successful in enabling sustainable peace or delivering a true democracy. Shortly 
after taking office, President Taylor abandoned liberal politics and ruled through 
coercion and force, thus sparking another rebel movement and another war. The short 
transition time after the peace agreement prevented the development of adequate 
institutional stability, including checks on executive power and open political 
opposition. This allowed President Taylor to suppress peaceful opposition and forced 
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his opponents to turn to violence, thus bringing about the recidivism of civil war. The 
rushed elections contributed to the failure to produce sustainable peace. 
The second case study involved Liberia's 2005 election, which followed the 
Second Liberian Civil War. Here, the elections followed a long transition period that 
lasted over two years. The longer transition period was possible because there was no 
immediate threat of a return to violence after President Taylor fled the country. All 
major parties were committed to rebuilding the state and establishing democratic 
governance and sustainable peace through holding elections. The elections were 
intended not only to end the war but to promote open democratic governance, which 
would increase the chance of a sustainable peace. 
The 2005 elections succeeded in advancing the dual goals of war termination 
and democratization. The timing was appropriate to achieve both goals and proved to 
be effective. The protracted transition period allowed sufficient time to rebuild the 
state before holding elections. The ability to put in place a transitional government, 
which managed the rebuilding of the state and thus created favorable conditions for 
democratization, made the successful 2005 elections possible. Throughout the two-
year transitional period the transitional government, with help of the international 
community, was able to address the underlying issues which led to the outbreak of 
war in the first place. 
In sum, the timing of post-conflict elections is a critical element requiring 
careful consideration to minimize the risk of producing adverse results. As stated, 
preferred timing depends on the utility and desired outcome of the elections. The 
goals of democratization require a longer transition time, where elections should 
follow a period of institution building, security provision, political development, etc. 
On the other hand, the limited goal of war termination may require rushed elections to 
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maintain consent from belligerents and keep the momentum following the peace 
agreement. In addition, despite the fact that rushed elections pose serious risks in 
fragile post-conflict environments, limited resources may require shorter time frames. 
Liberia has made great strides toward democratization. However, the true test 
of a young democracy - for the incumbent to peacefully hand over power if voted out 
of office or when term limits are reached - still lies ahead. 
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